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Equitably Housing (Almost) Half a Nation of
Renters
ANDREA J. BOYACK†
INTRODUCTION
Across America, the rent is too damn high.1 The
country’s population of renters is growing faster than the
supply of available rental units.2 Rental vacancies are
† Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law. J.D., University of
Virginia School of Law; M.A.L.D., Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts
University; B.A., Brigham Young University. I would like to thank Tim Iglesias
and the participants of the University of San Francisco School of Law’s
Symposium on Housing for Vulnerable Populations and the Middle Class:
Revisiting Housing Rights and Policies in a Time of Expanding Crisis for the
thought provoking discussion and helpful input reflected in this Article. A special
thank you to my son, Bowen, who inspires me to think outside the box.
1. “Rent is too DAMN high!” was the slogan popularized by habitual fringe
New York Governor and U.S. Presidential candidate Jimmy McMillan and his
self-named “Rent is Too Damn High Party.” RENT IS TOO “DAMN” HIGH,
http://www.rentistoodamnhigh.org (last visited Oct. 18, 2016). McMillan recently
announced his retirement from politics. Julia Zorthian, Founder of the “Rent Is
Too Damn High” Party is Leaving Politics, TIME (Dec. 10, 2015),
http://time.com/4144527/rent-is-too-damn-high-jimmy-mcmillan-leavingpolitics.
2. The current state of housing market problems involving inadequate,
expensive rental housing is discussed in the Joint Center for Housing Studies of
Harvard University’s most recent annual report. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES
OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2015, at 30–32 (2015)
[hereinafter STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2015]; see also infra Part I. The
country’s increasing rental demand is both predictable and predicted. See Arthur
C. Nelson, The New Urbanity: The Rise of a New America, 626 ANNALS AM.
ACADEMY POL. & SOC. SCIENCE 192 (2009) (forecasting that the current shift into
rental households will be “the most remarkable change in America’s built
environment since the end of World War II”). Professor Arthur Nelson of the
University of Utah predicts that half of all homes built between now and 2030
will have to be rental units to meet this growing demand. Id.; see also Arthur C.
Nelson, Demographic Outlook, 68 URB. LAND 196, 197 (2009); Arthur C. Nelson,
Catching the Next Wave: Older Adults and the “New Urbanism,” 33 J. AM. SOC’Y
ON AGING 37, 39, 41 (2010).
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reaching new lows, and rental rates are reaching new highs.3
Millions of former homeowners have lost their homes in
foreclosure and, due to today’s much tighter mortgage
underwriting realities, will not realistically re-enter the
ranks of owner-occupants.4 For a number of reasons—variety
of incomes, different stages in life, and a range of personal
preferences and lifestyles—homeownership is not for
everyone. And yet federal government housing policy has
consistently prioritized homeownership over renter-specific
issues, such as affordability, rental supply, and distribution.5
State and local housing assistance programs are shockingly
insufficient to meet ballooning needs. Reallocation of focus
and funds at the federal level, however, could help grow the
supply of rental housing and provide renters at all income

3. Josh Miller, Eye on Housing: Rental Vacancy Rate at 20 Year Low, NAT’L
ASS’N HOMEBUILDERS (Jan. 29, 2015), http://eyeonhousing.org/2015/01/rentalvacancy-rate-at-20-year-low; NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., OUT OF REACH
2015, at 4 (2015) [hereinafter OUT OF REACH], http://nlihc.org/sites/
default/files/oor/OOR_2015_FULL.pdf; ROBERT R. CALLIS & MELISSA KRESIN, U.S.
DEP’T COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RESIDENTIAL VACANCIES AND
HOMEOWNERSHIP IN THE FOURTH QUARTER 2014 (2015) [hereinafter U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU], www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/qtr414/currenthvsprees.pdf.
4. Approximately 4.5 million families lost their homes to foreclosure between
September 2008 and May 2013. CORELOGIC, CORELOGIC NATIONAL FORECLOSURE
REPORT 2 (2013), http://www.corelogic.com/research/foreclosure-report/nationalforeclosure-report-may-2013.pdf. Lenders’ underwriting standards have
significantly tightened since the Foreclosure Crisis. Although the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau and the Dodd-Frank Act have called for more
responsible credit standards in residential mortgage lending, most analysts
believe that “the pendulum has swung too far from the excesses of the pre-bust
era, and today’s credit box is tighter and more restrictive than underwriting
practice and experience justify.” BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., HOUSING AMERICA’S
FUTURE: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR NATIONAL POLICY 29 (2013) [hereinafter HOUSING
AMERICA’S FUTURE], http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/housing-americas-futurenew-directions-national-policy.
5. See WILLIAM APGAR, RETHINKING RENTAL HOUSING: EXPANDING THE ABILITY
RENTAL HOUSING TO SERVE AS A PATHWAY TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
OPPORTUNITY 4 (2004), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/
w04-11.pdf; see also infra Part II.
OF
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levels a realistic chance of occupying quality and affordable
rental housing, even in a “high opportunity neighborhood.”6
To help create a more renter-friendly alternative to the
“American Dream of homeownership,”7 the government must
first reorient its myopic housing policy focus away from an
over-emphasis on building homeownership.8 It must free up
government funds for use in support of affordable rental

6. The term “High Opportunity Neighborhood” comes from the “Moving to
Opportunities” experiment conducted between the late 1960s and 2015. See
MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., URBAN INST., BENEFITS OF LIVING IN HIGHOPPORTUNITY NEIGHBORHOODS: INSIGHTS FROM THE MOVING TO OPPORTUNITY
DEMONSTRATION (2012), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/public
ation-pdfs/412648-Benefits-of-Living-in-High-Opportunity-Neighborhoods.PDF.
This major, decades-long housing mobility experiment was sponsored by the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), building on earlier
academic studies. Id. at 1. The study followed 4600 low-income families with
children who lived in the most disadvantaged neighborhoods across the country.
Families were randomly assigned into one of three groups, and the members of
the test group were given housing vouchers that could only be used to move to a
“high opportunity neighborhood.” Id. A “high opportunity neighborhood” for
purposes of the Moving to Opportunity experiment was defined as a neighborhood
with poverty rates below 15% and labor force participation rates above 60%, with
more than 20% of adults having completed college. Id. at 2. The neighborhood
was also by definition predominantly (more than 70%) non-Hispanic white, and
there were more than 200,000 low-wage jobs located within five miles of the tract
centroid. Id.
7. The “American Dream” has long been connected to homeownership. See,
e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HOMEOWNERSHIP AND ITS BENEFITS:
URBAN POLICY BRIEF NO. 2 (1995), https://www.huduser.gov/publications/txt/
hdbrf2.txt; U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., THE NATIONAL HOMEOWNERSHIP
STRATEGY: PARTNERS IN THE AMERICAN DREAM (1995), www.globalurban.org/
national_homeownership_strategy.pdf
(explaining
how
“[e]xpanding
homeownership will strengthen our nation’s families and communities,
strengthen our economy, and expand this country’s great middle class” and
speaking of “[r]ekindling the dream of homeownership for America’s working
families”); see also Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH.
U.L. REV. 329 (2009) (detailing ways that federal tax policies attempt to grow
homeownership).
8. “Having a place to call home is a signature component of the American
dream.” Matthew Johnson, Stepping Up: How Cities Are Working to Keep
America’s Poorest Families Housed, URBAN INST. (June 16, 2015),
http://www.urban.org/features/stepping-how-cities-are-working-keep-americaspoorest-families-housed; see also infra Part II.
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housing.9 In addition, government funds and agency efforts
should be carefully allocated to increase the availability of
housing assistance and government gap funding of
affordable housing as well as to encourage private
investment in the supply of affordable rental housing.10
Part I of this Article discusses the origins and impacts of
our widening gap between supply of and demand for
affordable rental housing. Part II advocates that federal
housing policy should change its primary emphasis from
building homeownership to supporting the development of
affordable rental options. Part III explores ways that the
federal government could act to encourage development of an
adequate and de-concentrated supply of rental units for all
income levels.
I. BE IT RENTED OR OWNED, THERE’S NO PLACE LIKE HOME
America’s population of renters is large and rapidly
growing larger.11 Not only is the population of the country
growing—expected to reach 334 million by 2020 and 416
million by 2060—but the percentage of this population that
rents rather than owns their home is growing as well.12 The
country’s homeownership rate, for the first time in decades,
has fallen below 64%, and only 55.5% of the country’s
9. See infra Part II. Integrated neighborhoods of owners and renters also
require removal of land use barriers to locating rental occupied homes near
owner-occupied homes. See Andrea J. Boyack, American Dream in Flux: The
Endangered Right to Lease a Home, 49 REAL PROP. TRUST & EST. L.J. 203, 221–
24 (2014).
10. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE
NATION’S HOUSING 5 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 HARVARD HOUSING STUDY]; JOINT
CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY
TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POLICY 20, 22–23 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 HARVARD
HOUSING STUDY]; see also infra Part III.
11. “2014 marked the 10th consecutive year of robust renter household
growth” which “puts the 2010s on track to be the strongest decade for renter
growth in history.” STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2015, supra note 2, at 25.
12. SANDRA L. COLBY & JENNIFER M. ORTMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, PROJECTIONS OF THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE U.S.
POPULATION: 2014 TO 2060, at 2 (2015).
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housing units are currently owner-occupied.13 The drop in
homeownership naturally means that more households are
renting, and the recent, dramatic increase in renter
households is expected to grow even more dramatically in the
decades to come.14 Renters are more likely to be younger (or
older), to be minorities or immigrants, and more likely to be
unmarried.15 As a whole, however, the renter population is
an incredibly diverse group.16 Minority households and lowincome
households
are
disproportionately
renter
households.17
The demographics of our country are profoundly
changing during this generation, and these changes are
“transforming the country and our housing needs.”18
Members of the “Baby Boom” generation are moving out of

13. Quarterly Residential Vacancies and Homeownership, Third Quarter 2016,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Oct. 27, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.census.gov/housing/
hvs/files/currenthvspress.pdf.
14. Demand for rental housing is growing, and that the trend will continue as
those under 35 years of age form households of their own. See JOINT CTR. FOR
HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 22 (2013),
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/son2013.pdf.
15. Housing Vacancies and Homeownership (CPS/HVS), Table 17:
Homeownership Rates for the United States, by Age of Householder and by Family
Status: 1983 to 2013, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/housing/
hvs/data/ann13ind.html (follow “Homeownership Rates by Age of Householder
and Family Status for the United States” hyperlink under “Detailed Tables”) (last
visited Dec. 7, 2016); see also Lewis M. Segal & Daniel G. Sullivan, Trends in
Homeownership: Race, Demographics, and Income, 22 ECON. PERSP. 53, 53–57
(1998).
16. APGAR, supra note 5, at 3.
17. Id. at 23; see Housing Vacancies and Homeownership (CPS/HVS), supra
note 15; see also Segal & Sullivan, supra note 15; Thomas P. Boehm & Alan M.
Schlottmann, The Dynamics of Race, Income, and Homeownership, 55 J. URB.
ECON. 113, 114–15 (2004).
18. HOUSING AMERICA’S FUTURE, supra note 4, at 7, 15–25; see also ROLF
PENDELL ET AL., BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. HOUSING MARKETS (2012), http://www.urban.org/sites/
default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/412520-Demographic-Challenges-andOpportunities-for-U-S-Housing-Markets.PDF.
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their prime homeownership years, retiring and downsizing.19
Even though a large percentage of baby boomers are
currently homeowners (larger than any other age group), and
even though many of these homeowners intend to age in
place (at least in the short term), as the Baby Boom
population continues to age and as the economic challenges
of being on a fixed income continue to create housing
affordability problems for seniors, more will move into
smaller units or assisted living and senior housing
developments.20
Although “Generation X” is entering what traditionally
would be prime homeownership years,21 homeownership for
Americans in their 30s and 40s was hit hard by the
Foreclosure Crisis and has been falling ever since.22 A high
percentage of the members of this generation first became
homeowners during the boom years before the Crisis, and
thus were more likely to have overpaid for their homes and
have taken out risky mortgages.23 Members of Generation X
19. The U.S. Census Bureau defines the “Baby Boom” generation as including
individuals born between 1946 and 1964. SANDRA L. COLBY & JENNIFER M.
ORTMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BABY BOOM COHORT
IN THE UNITED STATES: 2012 TO 2060, at 2 (2014), https://www.census.
gov/prod/2014pubs/p25-1141.pdf.
20. STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2015, supra note 2, at 1, 5, 13. “Paying too
much for housing leaves seniors with inadequate income to pay for medications,
healthy food, and other necessities.” HOUSING AMERICA’S FUTURE, supra note 4,
at 19.
21. George Masnick, of the Harvard Joint Center for Housing Studies, defines
this generation (which he calls the “baby bust”) as including individuals born
between 1965 and 1984. George Masnick, Defining the Generations, HARVARD
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES (Nov. 28, 2012), http://housingperspectives.
blogspot.com/2012/11/defining-generations.html.
22. See WEI LI & LAURIE GOODMAN, URBAN INST., COMPARING CREDIT PROFILES
AMERICAN RENTERS AND OWNERS 16 (2016), http://www.urban.org/sites/
default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000652-Comparing-Credit-Profiles-ofAmerican-Renters-and-Owners.pdf; see also Shane Ferro, Gen X Is the Most
Screwed Generation When It Comes to Real Estate, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 30,
2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/gen-x-screwed-real-estate-housingcrisis_us_56fad298e4b0143a9b497c9c.
OF

23. See LI & GOODMAN, supra note 22, at 16.
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are correspondingly more likely to have lost or be at risk of
risk losing their homes, and many have already joined or will
eventually join the ranks of former-homeowner renters.24
The “Echo Boom” or “Millennial Generation” exerts a
very strong influence on housing trends in the United
States.25 On average, Millennials have been delaying
independent household formation by moving home or in with
roommates after college and by staying single (and childless)
longer.26 This younger segment of the American population
has shown both a more pronounced preference for renting
and a greater financial inability to become homeowners.27
More than 69% of Millennials rent their homes compared
with 36.4% of all householders in the country.28 The
preference for rental housing, and the inaccessibility or delay
of Millennial homeownership, “contributes to the high
demand for rental housing that is driving rent increases in
many metro areas across the country.”29 In addition, the
24. See id.
25. This generation includes “[t]hose born between 1981 and 1995.” HOUSING
AMERICA’S FUTURE, supra note 4, at 7. According to the Harvard Joint Center for
Housing Studies, this generation is a bit broader, including individuals born
between 1985 and 2004. Masnick, supra note 21; see also A. Mechele Dickerson,
Millennials, Affordable Housing, and the Future of Homeownership, 24 J.
AFFORDABLE
HOUS.
&
COMMUNITY
DEV.
L.
435,
436
(2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/affordable_housing/
publication/journalaffordhouselaw/2015/AH%2024-3_06Dickerson.pdf,
(“The
millennials [were] born between 1980 and the mid-2000s.”).
26. See STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2015, supra note 2, at 5, 13, 17, 18.
27. Id. at 2; LEIGH GALLAGHER, THE END OF THE SUBURBS: WHERE THE
AMERICAN DREAM IS MOVING 158 (2013); c.f. HOUSING AMERICA’S FUTURE, supra
note 4, at 10. (indicating that “[m]illions of Americans continue to see
homeownership as a critical cornerstone of the American Dream” and that “[t]his
sentiment is especially strong within the growing Hispanic community”).
28. NAT’L HOUS. CONFERENCE & CTR. FOR HOUS. POLICY, PAYCHECK TO
PAYCHECK: A SNAPSHOT OF HOUSING AFFORDABILITY FOR MILLENNIAL WORKERS
(2015) [hereinafter PAYCHECK TO PAYCHECK]. Notwithstanding affordability
hurdles, over 65% of Millennials hope to become homeowners within five years.
Id.; see also M. LEANNE LACHMAN & DEBORAH L. BRETT, URBAN LAND INST.,
GENERATION Y: AMERICA’S NEW HOUSING WAVE (2011).
29. PAYCHECK TO PAYCHECK, supra note 28, at 5; see Marine Cole, Housing
Recovery Leaves Millennials Out in the Cold, FISCAL TIMES (May 4, 2014),
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racial and ethnic makeup of our country is changing.
Compared to earlier generations, a much higher percentage
of Millennials are non-white, and, as a whole, America is
becoming more and more diverse.30 These changes make
affordable rental housing and residential integration
increasingly critical issues for each of the country’s
demographic groups.
Growing demand for rental housing outpaces supply. As
fewer and fewer people buy homes, rental demand increases
and rental markets “rapidly tighten.”31 In 2014, as the
country’s homeownership rate dropped to its lowest rate in
twenty years, the national rental vacancy rate fell to a
twenty-plus year low of 7%.32 In some places, such as in
Oregon, rental vacancy rates are less than 1%.33 In nine of
America’s eleven largest cities there has been double-digit
growth in the percentage of renters since 2006.34 The
adequacy of rental housing supply is threatened not only by
low quantity of new units, but also by the loss of existing
units. Much of the nation’s rental housing is old and
deteriorating and requires rehabilitation to remain usable.
Furthermore, over the past few decades, many multifamily
affordable rental buildings have been converted into

http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/05/04/Housing-Recovery-LeavesMillennials-Out-Cold.
30. Joel Kotkin, The Changing Demographics of America, SMITHSONIAN (Aug.
2010),
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/40th-anniversary/the-changingdemographics-of-america-538284/?no-ist (“The U.S. minority population,
currently 30 percent, is expected to exceed 50 percent before 2050. No other
advanced, populous country will see such diversity.”).
31. OUT OF REACH, supra note 3, at iii.
32. Miller, supra note 3; OUT
BUREAU, supra note 3.

OF

REACH, supra note 3, at 4; U.S. CENSUS

33. OUT OF REACH, supra note 3, at iii.
34. OUT OF REACH, supra note 3, at 4; see also INGRID GOULD ELLEN & BRIAN
KARFUNKEL, NYU FURMAN CTR. & CAPITAL ONE, RENTING IN AMERICA’S LARGEST
METROPOLITAN AREAS (2016), http://furmancenter.org/files/NYU_Furman_Center
_Capital_One_National_Affordable_Rental_Housing_Landscape_2016.pdf.
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condominiums or market-rate rentals.35 Since 2001, “[o]ver
12.8% of nation’s supply of low-income housing, or 650,000
units, ha[s] been permanently lost from the stock of
affordable
rental
housing . . . due
to
36
conversion . . . demolition, or obsolescence.”
Supply inadequacies in rental housing across most
income levels have exacerbated housing affordability
problems.37 Already, for decades, the United States has been
struggling with an acknowledged “crisis” in rental housing
affordability.38 The median asking rate for rentals is now
higher than ever before, having nearly doubled in the past
two decades.39 “Unlike trends in earlier years, rents are
rising nationwide, with many mid-sized metropolitan areas
such as Denver, CO experiencing rents rising on par or faster
than larger metropolitan areas such as San Francisco, CA.”40
Some of the fastest-growing rental markets in January 2015
were mid-sized cities, including Denver, CO; Kansas City,

35. Preserving Affordable Rental Housing: A Snapshot of Growing Need,
Current Threats, and Innovative Solutions, EVIDENCE MATTERS, Summer 2013, at
1, 4–5.
36. Affordable Rental Hous. A.C.T.I.O.N., The Case for Expanding the LowIncome Housing Tax Credit, AFFORDABLE HOUSING TAX CREDIT COALITION
[hereinafter Expanding LIHTC], http://www.taxcreditcoalition.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/12/Revised-Need-Document.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2016).
37. Rental markets are tight, particularly at the low end, and new construction
has not kept up with demand. The inadequacy of supply of rental units,
particularly rental units that are affordable, has caused rents to skyrocket over
the past several years, doubling the inflation rate and, in 2014, increasing at the
fastest rate since 2008. See STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2015, supra note 2,
at 2, 3 fig.3.
38. See generally JOHN I. GILDERBLOOM & RICHARD P. APPELBAUM, RETHINKING
RENTAL HOUSING 3, 7–8 (1988).
39. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 3, at 2.
40. OUT OF REACH, supra note 3, at 6; see also Kris Hudson, Smaller Cities Led
Way in Rent Increases in 2014, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 5, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/smaller-cities-led-way-in-rent-increases-in-20141420519636.
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MO; Nashville, TN; and Portland, OR.41 Rental rates for
apartments “have risen nationally for 23 straight
quarters.”42 On average, rents went up 15.2% between end of
2009 and mid-2014.43 Rapidly rising rents outpace wages,
which have become fairly stagnant for most Americans.44
“Expanding and preserving the supply of quality, affordable
housing is essential to any strategy to end homelessness,
poverty, and economic inequality.”45
Affordable units are nearly as costly to build as luxury
units (same or similar construction and land acquisition
costs), and they offer far less rental income return on
investment. In some ways, affordable units are even costlier
to develop in terms of regulatory compliance and land use
approvals, and in terms of financeability.46 As a result, even
though the market has naturally responded to the growing
demand for rental housing by starting to build more rental
units, most newly constructed rental housing has been highend, luxury apartments.47 Building luxury rental units does
increase supply, but only for the top echelon of renters, and
higher rental rates for new luxury units actually “puts
41. OUT OF REACH, supra note 3, at 6; Diana Olick, High Rents Trickle Down
to Smaller Cities, CNBC (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/02/19/highrents-trickle-down-to-smaller-cities.html.
42. OUT OF REACH, supra note 3, at 4.
43. Id.; Robbie Whelan, Apartment Rents Are Rising Steadily and Quickly,
WALL STREET J. (Oct. 1, 2014), www.wsj.com/articles/apartment-rents-are-risingsteadily-and-quickly-1412220601.
44. Lawrence Mishel, et al., Wage Stagnation in Nine Charts, ECON. POL’Y
INST. (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/charting-wage-stagnation.
45. OUT OF REACH, supra note 3, at 1; see also ELLEN & KARFUNKEL, supra note
34.
46. OUT OF REACH, supra note 3, at 5; see STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2015,
supra note 2, at 33. Difficulties in financing affordable housing development are
increased when capital subsidies dry up because of government budgetary cuts.
See OUT OF REACH, supra note 3, at 5.
47. PAYCHECK TO PAYCHECK, supra note 28; Laura Kusisto, Rents Rise Faster
for Midtier Apartments than Luxury Ones, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 16, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/rents-rise-faster-for-midtier-apartments-thanluxury-ones-1439769468.
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upward pressure” on the rental rates of existing units.48
“Analysts expect that each year over the next decade, an
average of over 400,000 new renter households will enter the
rental housing market and that the majority of these will be
low-income.”49 Based on the current rate of additional
affordable rental units and the growing need for rental
housing, the gap between rental housing supply and demand
will continue to grow, rents will continue to rise, and housing
affordability will become increasingly out of reach.50
Along with income inequality, the number of low- and
extremely low-income renters has grown significantly in
recent years.51 In 2013, close to one out of every four of the
nation’s renter households was an extremely low-income
(ELI) household.52 Those approximately 10.3 million ELI
renter households struggle with various “economic
challenges” including “lagging wages, inconsistent job
growth, and the rising cost of living.”53 As the number of ELI
renters has increased, the supply of rental housing
affordable to these lowest-income renters has stagnated.
Thus, “in 2013, for every 100 [ELI] renter households, there
were just 31 affordable and available units.”54 We need 8.2
million more affordable rental homes for ELI households

48. PAYCHECK TO PAYCHECK, supra note 28; Kusisto, supra note 47.
49. Expanding LIHTC, supra note 36.
50. Id.; see ELLEN & KARFUNKEL, supra note 34.
51. See URBAN LAND INST. & ENTERPRISE, BENDING THE COST CURVE: SOLUTIONS
EXPAND THE SUPPLY OF AFFORDABLE RENTALS 8 (2014), http://uli.org/wpcontent/uploads/ULI-Documents/BendingCostCurve-Solutions_2014_web.pdf
(pointing out that “as of 2011 there were 12.1 million extremely low-income
renters, an increase of 2.5 million since 2007”).
TO

52. OUT OF REACH, supra note 3, at 5–6; Nat’l Low Income Hous. Coal.,
Affordable Housing is Nowhere to be Found for Millions, HOUSING SPOTLIGHT,
Mar. 2015, at 1, 2.
53. OUT OF REACH, supra note 3, at 1.
54. Id. at 5. An extremely low-income household is defined as a household
earning less than 30% of the Area’s Median Income. Id.
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than we currently have.55 The lack of affordable options
means that ELI households pay an inordinately high
percentage of their income on housing: 75% of them (7.8
million) spend more than 50% of income on housing.56 On
average, ELI households can afford to spend, at most, $509
in monthly rent.57 To make matters worse, over the past
decade, 13% of units that had rented for less than $400 per
month have been removed from the housing stock.58
The affordable rental-housing crisis creates the greatest
harm to those at the lowest income levels, but it affects
renters across the spectrum. Today’s market rents are “out
of reach” for many workers, and “the number of renters
spending more than they can afford on housing is
unacceptably high and growing.”59 The total number of
households spending more than 50% of their income and/or
living in severely inadequate housing is up 49% since 2003.60
This means that, “[a]n unprecedented 11 million renter
households—more than one in four of all renters in the
U.S.—spend more than half of their monthly income on
rent.”61 There is not a single state in which a minimum wage
full-time worker earns enough to afford a one-bedroom
apartment at fair market rent.62 A worker in America today
needs to earn an hourly wage of $19.35 just to afford the
55. Affordable Rental Hous. A.C.T.I.O.N., Building Affordable Housing
Communities Using the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 5 (Spring 2015),
www.taxcreditcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Housing-Credit-EdDeck-March-2015-ver-14-3.pdf; see also OUT OF REACH, supra note 3, at 7
(estimating the gap in extremely low-income housing at 7.1 million units).
56. OUT OF REACH, supra note 3, at 5–6; see also Nat’l Low Income Hous. Coal.,
supra note 52, at 2.
57. OUT OF REACH, supra note 3, at 6.
58. Affordable Rental Hous. A.C.T.I.O.N., supra note 55, at 4.
59. HOUSING AMERICA’S FUTURE, supra note 4, at 7; see also OUT
supra note 3, at 1–2.

OF

REACH,

60. Expanding LIHTC, supra note 36.
61. Id. (emphasis removed); see also OUT OF REACH, supra note 3, at iii.
62. OUT OF REACH, supra note 3, at 1.
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average priced two-bedroom rental unit.63 In thirteen states
and the District of Columbia, the housing wage has risen
above $20 per hour.64
The 53 million Millennials currently attempting to form
households as they come of age find it increasingly difficult
to afford housing because of a combination of a tight job
market, flat or declining real wages, ballooning student loan
debt, and increasingly high rental rates.65 These Millennials,
who currently make up about one third of the country’s
workforce, are far less likely to be able to afford
homeownership than were members of prior generations
when they were in their twenties.66 The National Housing
Conference and the Center for Housing Policy reported that
Millennials “have difficulty finding housing they can afford,”
whether rental or owned.67 The study found that not only can
the majority of Millennials ill afford homeownership; most
must pay in excess of 30% of their income as rent.68 In some
areas, the percentage of income necessarily devoted to rent
can approach three times that affordability threshold. For
example, in Los Angeles, a cashier would have to pay more
than 75% of her paycheck “just for housing.”69 And “the gap
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. PAYCHECK TO PAYCHECK, supra note 28. This study defines “Millennials” as
adults who were born after 1980. See id. at 2; see also Dickerson, supra note 25,
at 436.
66. See id. at 2.
67. Id. at 1. The study defines affordable rentals as a rental rate that is no
more than 30% of income and defines affordable home as a home that will require
a mortgage payment of no more than 28% of income if a 10% down payment is
paid at closing. Id. at 2. The study found that “[h]ouseholds that spend more than
30 percent of their income on housing are often forced to cut back on other
essentials, such as food, healthcare or childcare, or to live in substandard housing
or overcrowded conditions.” Id. at 5; see also MAYA BRENNAN ET AL., NAT’L HOUS.
CONFERENCE, THE IMPACTS OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING ON EDUCATION: A RESEARCH
SUMMARY (2014), http://media.wix.com/ugd/19cfbe_c1919d4c2bdf40929852291a5
7e5246f.pdf.
68. See generally PAYCHECK TO PAYCHECK, supra note 28.
69. PAYCHECK TO PAYCHECK, supra note 28, at 3.
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between what people earn and the price of decent housing
continues to grow.”70
Our affordable housing crisis is caused by a combination
of factors, including “increased demand for rental units,”
government budget cuts, “years of stagnating income at the
low end of the economic spectrum,” and loss of supply from
the rental housing stock.71 Low-income renters face
additional and more intense challenges as the affordability
of housing decreases. When lower income renters spend more
on housing, they may be unable to spend enough for food,
healthcare, childcare, and other essentials. “In both rural
and urban America, renters are affected by the affordable
housing shortage, with 49% having a cost burden [paying
more than 30% of income on housing], and 27% with a severe
cost burden [paying more than 50% of income on housing].”72
To date, government responses to the affordable rental
crisis have been insufficient. In 2008, the federal government
established the National Housing Trust Fund (NHTF) “to
address the need for additional affordable housing.”73 The
NHTF purportedly created “a dedicated pool of funding” to
be used to create additional units for “the lowest income,
most vulnerable households” (90% for rental only and 75% of
that amount for designated ELI households).74 Although
desperately needed, the NHTF was immediately rendered
impotent when Congress suspended its funding in 2008.75
The suspension of funding continued through 2014. Finally,
starting January 1, 2015, Congress permitted funding to be
70. OUT OF REACH, supra note 3, at 1.
71. Affordable Rental Hous. A.C.T.I.O.N., supra note 55, at 4.
72. OUT OF REACH, supra note 3, at 6 (explanatory information in brackets
taken from Affordable Rental Hous. A.C.T.I.O.N., supra note 55).
73. OUT OF REACH, supra note 3, at 7. “The [N]HTF was established under Title
I of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Section 1131 (Public Law
110–289).” Housing Trust Fund, HUD EXCHANGE, https://www.hudexchange.info/
programs/htf (last visited Dec. 7, 2016).
74. OUT OF REACH, supra note 3, at 7.
75. See id.
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approved for the NHTF.76 Over the course of calendar year
2015, $120 to $300 million was slated to be allocated to the
NHTF, but even if that funding was made (and it is it not yet
clear that it was), it would not be sufficient to cover the
growing unmet need for housing assistance.77 The National
Low Income Housing Coalition has recently proposed modest
changes to the mortgage interest tax deduction that would
generate enough new revenue to take NHTF to scale.78 To
date, however, a reduction in the mortgage income tax
deduction has proved to be a political non-starter.
Federal
housing
assistance
programs
help
approximately five million households afford housing, but
only one-fourth of eligible households receive housing
assistance.79 In 2013, “[t]here were an estimated 7.7 million
unassisted very low-income renters with worst case housing
needs.”80 Furthermore, supply of federally subsidized
housing is shrinking because subsidy contracts are
expiring.81 Lack of sufficient federal housing assistance to
cover needs means that there are long (and sometimes
closed) waiting lists for public and assisted housing.82 For
example, “[a]fter the Chicago Housing Authority opened its
waiting list for new residents for the first time in several
years, 80,000 city residents applied for assistance in a single
76. Id.
77. Id. The first NHTF dollars are now available. National Housing Trust
Fund, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION, http://nlihc.org/issues/nhtf (last
visited Oct. 29, 2016). “During 2015, States will begin developing their [N]HTF
Allocation Plans and solicit input from their constituents and submit these plans
to HUD along with their 2016 Annual Acton [sic] Plans. HUD anticipates that
grantees will receive their [N]HTF allocations by summer 2016.” Housing Trust
Fund, supra note 73.
78. OUT OF REACH, supra note 3, at 7.
79. HOUSING AMERICA’S FUTURE, supra note 4, at 10–11; see also OUT OF REACH,
supra note 3, at iii (noting that “only 25 percent of eligible households receive
housing assistance”).
80. Expanding LIHTC, supra note 36.
81. OUT OF REACH, supra note 3, at 5.
82. See OUT OF REACH, supra note 3, at 5.

124

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

day.”83 In Boston, the Massachusetts Rental Voucher
program issued only seventy-three new vouchers, for which
over 10,000 city residents competed.84 Because state
allocating agencies annually receive more than twice as
many applications for Housing Credit as is available, only
one quarter of the households eligible for assistance receive
it.85
Furthermore, most affordable rental housing options are
geographically clustered in impoverished, majority-minority
neighborhoods, further entrenching racial housing
inequality and its related social injustices. The propensity for
affordable housing to be located in minority neighborhoods is
well known and was one of the cited justifications for the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD)
new Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Rule.86
Concentrating
affordable
housing
in
high-poverty
neighborhoods keeps populations segregated by income, and
this leads to disparate neighborhood opportunities offered to
the poor and to the rich. It also perpetuates de facto housing
83. Id.; see also Lolly Bowean, Chicago Housing Authority Opens Wait Lists for
Public Housing, Vouchers, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 27, 2014, 7:22 PM), http://www.chicago
tribune.com/news/ct-cha-waiting-list-met-1028-20141027-story.html.
84. OUT OF REACH, supra note 3, at 5; see also Katie Johnston, Demand Soars
for Affordable Housing in Boston Area, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 28, 2014), https://
www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/11/28/demand-for-affordable-housingsoars/hCb4RSkLTbpqdMJR1eCYTI/story.html.
85. Affordable Rental Hous. A.C.T.I.O.N., supra note 55, at 5.
86. See generally An Overview of HUD’s Proposed Affirmatively Furthering
Fair Housing Rule, FAIR HOUSING COUNCIL OF OR., http://fhco.org/learningresources/downloads/category/7-affh (last visited Oct. 7, 2016). Debby Goldberg,
Vice President of the National Fair Housing Alliance, explained that, “[w]e have
a history of putting affordable housing in poor communities.” Tim Devaney,
Obama Making Bid to Diversify Wealthy Neighborhoods, HILL (June 11, 2015,
6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/regulation/244620-obamas-bid-to-diversify-wealthyneighborhoods. The Brookings Institute, nearly a decade earlier, also highlighted
the problem that “a substantial share of the affordable rental stock is
concentrated in distressed, high-poverty neighborhoods.” Bruce Katz & Margery
Austin Turner, Rethinking U.S. Rental Housing Policy: Build on State & Local
Innovations, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2016/06/PB_Housing_Katz.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2016).
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segregation by race. Nevertheless, there has historically
been tension between fair housing advocates arguing for
inclusion and affordable housing advocates claiming that the
paramount concern is creating more affordable housing
units, even if these are located in low-income
neighborhoods.87 Finding a way to create a greater quantity
of affordable housing options located within lower-poverty
neighborhoods is the only way to address both rental
affordability and neighborhood segregation housing
concerns.
II. HOUSING POLICY AND THE OWNER/RENTER DIVIDE
A defensible housing policy must prioritize support of
affordable rentals at least as much as homeownership. There
are compelling fairness and stability problems in a housing
system that forces people to choose between affordable
housing and quality neighborhoods with accessible
employment options and decent quality education.88 To
achieve an integrated supply of rental homes at all income
levels and in all locations, government policies and priorities
must shift.
Historically, and increasingly in the past few decades,
our society and government policies have deliberately
rewarded and promoted homeownership as the preferable
housing choice, justifying subsidies by claiming that
homeownership grows individual well-being and achieves

87. Myron Orfield, Racial Integration and Community Revitalization:
Applying the Fair Housing Act to the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, 58 VAND.
L. REV. 1747, 1753 (2005) (explaining “the deep legal and philosophical
contradiction in the United States between civil rights guarantees—particularly
the duty to affirmatively further fair housing—and state and federal low-income
housing policy” and arguing that fair housing duty should take priority before
other policy considerations); see also John J. Infranca, Housing Resource Bundles:
Distributive Justice and Federal Low-Income Housing Policy, 49 U. RICH. L. REV.
1071, 1137 (2015) (advocating for equality and utilization of the “bundle of
resources approach” to achieve this end).
88. HOUSING AMERICA’S FUTURE, supra note 4, at 10.
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broader civic goals.89 Property owners traditionally have
been favored over renters in a variety of contexts, including
historic property requirements for voting and holding public
office, past and present tax policies specifically benefitting
owners but not renters, and existing local land use policies
that limit access of renters to high-opportunity
neighborhoods.90 The government’s policy preference for
homeownership reflects the “ideology of property” that
justifies preferential treatment of owners, over mere
occupiers, based on a view that owners are better citizens
and therefore more deserving.91 Until the Foreclosure Crisis,
the vast majority of economic and social science research
supported this centerpiece of U.S. housing policy, namely
that encouraging homeownership is a proxy for and a means
to achieve a wide variety of positive social outcomes,
“including household wealth, savings and investment
behavior, mobility, labor force participation, urban spatial
structure, residential segregation, home maintenance,
political and social activities, health, self-esteem, education
and other children-related outcomes.”92 The research did not,
however, adequately justify treating homeownership as the
correct, necessary, or only means to these ends.93
The government promotes homeownership in both direct
and subtle ways. The government-created secondary
residential mortgage market is one of the biggest policydriven contributors to increased homeownership in America.
The government-sponsored secondary mortgage market
increases the supply of residential mortgage capital and
decreases the cost of residential mortgage capital, allowing
89. See APGAR, supra note 5, at 4.
90. Id. at 16.
91. See Donald A. Krueckeberg, The Grapes of Rent: A History of Renting in a
Country of Owners, 10 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 9, 9–10 (1999); see generally
KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES 190–94 (1985).
92. APGAR, supra note 5, at 4.
93. See id. at 37–38.
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more people to leverage the purchase of a home. The
National Housing Act of 1934 led to the creation of the
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and the Federal
National Mortgage Association (now officially known as
“Fannie Mae” or just “Fannie”).94 By 1970, Fannie and its
sibling entity, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(“Freddie Mac” or just “Freddie”) developed into privately
funded, publicly regulated, “government sponsored
enterprises” (GSEs).95 The GSEs were charged with
promoting housing options for Americans, and they did this
by purchasing qualifying residential mortgage loans to pool
and securitize in order to create mortgage capital market
liquidity. The GSEs also provide capital support for
multifamily housing projects.96 The GSEs have been most
active and visible in their homeownership-promotion role,
and over the course of a couple decades, the “robust
secondary market for mortgages” which they created
“markedly changed the nature of the U.S. residential

94. Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 450
(1970). For details on the structure and purposes of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
see Robert Van Order, Understanding Fannie and Freddie, RICHARD’S REAL EST.
& URB. ECON. BLOG (July 31, 2008), http://real-estate-and-urban.blogspot.com/
2008/07/robert-van-order-on-fannie-and-freddie.html.
95. Van Order, supra note 94; Andrea J. Boyack, Laudable Goals and
Unintended Consequences: The Role and Control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
60 AM. U.L. REV. 1489 (2011) [hereinafter Boyack, Laudable Goals].
Previously, in 1968, Fannie Mae had been split into a “private”
corporation (Fannie Mae) and a publicly financed institution with
explicit government guaranty of repayment of securities (Government
National Mortgage Association or Ginnie Mae). Ginnie Mae bought and
securitized mortgages which were made to government employees or
veterans (such mortgages also being guaranteed by the government). In
addition to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, there are twelve Federal Home
Loan Banks (the FHLBs, sometimes called the “mini-GSEs”). These
banks perform similar functions as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
(providing funds to originating lending institutions).
Id. at 1495 n.19 (citations omitted).
96. See infra Section III.B.
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mortgage system and increased market liquidity and capital
available for home financing.”97
Federal capital support for mortgage lending, first
through various government programs such as FHA
mortgage insurance and the GI Bill, and then also through
the activities of the GSEs, has been a critical contributing
factor in growing homeownership in the United States,98
although recently the public cost and benefit of maintaining
the GSEs has been intensely debated.99 The GSEs’ secondary
market purchases were funded by private capital, and their
salutatory effects in the market were intended to be tax and
budget-neutral, but because of the government’s implicit
(and later explicit) guaranty of Fannie and Freddie solvency,
private profit in the boom times ended up being funded
through socialized losses (taxpayer bailout) when the market

97. Boyack, Laudable Goals, supra note 95, at 1495–508.
98. See id. at 1499; U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL
CENSUS OF HOUSING TABLES: HOMEOWNERSHIP (2011), http://www.census.gov/
hhes/www/housing/census/historic/owner.html. A significant portion of
homeownership increase from the 1940s to the 1960s was due to the GI Bill and
veterans’ administration loans, offered to soldiers returning from World War II
and, later, Korea and Vietnam. See, e.g., Daniel K. Fetter, How Do Mortgage
Subsidies Affect Home Ownership? Evidence from the Mid-Century GI Bills, 5 AM.
ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 111 (2013). The GSEs had greater impacts in the 1970s
through today.
99. See Boyack, Laudable Goals, supra note 95, at 1527–31. In terms of both
market share and actual dollars, GSE securitized debt is huge. In 2006, the GSEs
held at least $4.3 trillion in mortgage debt, according to James Lockhart, Director
of the regulatory oversight agency OFHEO. Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis
Inquiry Comm’n, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (statement of James Lockhart, Director,
Federal Housing Finance Agency) [hereinafter James Lockhart Statement],
https://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0409Lockhart.pdf. Professor Anthony Sanders of George Mason University and
Member of Mercatus Center’s Financial Markets Working Group highlighted
that the combined debt load for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home
Loan Bank stood at $8 trillion in 2010. See Housing Finance—What Should the
New System Be Able to Do? Part I—Government and Stakeholder Perspectives:
Hearing Before H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of
Anthony B. Sanders, Professor of Finance, George Mason University),
http://mercatus.org/video/housing-finance-reform.
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crashed.100 In the wake of the Foreclosure Crisis, policy
debates raged about the future of the GSEs.101 The issue has
not yet been resolved.
Saving Fannie and Freddie was critical to salvaging the
U.S. economy and protecting American homeowners and
renters alike.102 After the Foreclosure Crisis, private
mortgage capital dried up, and GSE mortgage capital funds
served as the essential lifeblood of the mortgage market. The
GSEs, together with the FHA, have funded or subsidized
funding for more than 90% of single-family residential
mortgage loans in the years since the Crisis.103 It was the
existence of government-supported mortgage funding that
helped homeownership in this country to increase about

100. See Boyack, Laudable Goals, supra note 95, at 1518–27. “Instead of public
support paying for a public good (increased market liquidity), taxpayer funds
ended up being allocated to prop up individual market players.” Id. at 1520; see
also Oversight Hearing to Examine Recent Treasury and FHFA Actions
Regarding the Housing GSEs: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th
Cong. (2008) (statement of Herbert M. Allison, President and CEO, Fannie Mae)
(testifying on the GSE’s post-bailout goals); Robert Van Order, Privatization
Won’t Reduce Risk, N.Y. TIMES (March 8, 2011, 2:17 PM),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/03/07/should-fannie-and-freddiebe-disssolved/privatization-wont-reduce-risk (“That is the paradox of guarantees.
They produce incentives to take on too much risk, as they did with Fannie and
Freddie after 2004 and with the savings and loans in the 1980s, but they also
limit systemic risk and panic. It’s hard to have one without the other.”).
101. See Boyack, Laudable Goals, supra note 95, at 1527–31.
102. See id. at 1521–27. “Rescuing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 2008 was
necessary to keep the residential mortgage market machinery from grinding to a
halt and to mitigate the impact of the crash on homeowners and homebuyers.”
Id. at 1526. But compare Paul Krugman, Fannie, Freddie, and You, N.Y. TIMES
(July 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/14/opinion/14krugman.html
(arguing that Fannie and Freddie were not significantly to blame for the
foreclosure crisis and the subsequent GSE bailout), with Bill Mann et al., The
People Responsible for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, MOTLEY FOOL (Sept. 10,
2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.fool.com/investing/dividends-income/2008/09/10/
the-people-responsible-for-fannie-mae-and-freddie-.aspx (claiming that Fannie
and Freddie were major contributors to the “widespread gross financial
misconduct” that led to the crisis).
103. HOUSING AMERICA’S FUTURE, supra note 4, at 8.
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twenty-three percentage points from 1940–2000.104 And it
was the existence of government-supported mortgage
funding that allowed the purchase and sale of residential
real estate to continue in the aftermath of the 2008
Foreclosure Crisis.
Another key, and likely more quantifiable, way that the
government encourages homeownership is through tax
subsidies. Homeowners enjoy a variety of tax benefits,
including the mortgage interest deduction. The mortgage
interest tax deduction represents a federal subsidy of
homeownership costs, to the tune of approximately $80
billion a year.105 If homeownership were less central to
federal housing policy, then savings from reducing this huge
tax subsidy could be applied towards growing and
diversifying affordable rental housing.106 For example, the
National Low Income Housing Coalition pointed out that
even a small change to the mortgage interest tax deduction
would free up enough revenue to fully fund the heretofore
resource-starved National Housing Trust Fund.107
Making homeownership the primary housing policy
priority in lieu of ensuring the adequacy of rental housing
has, in several ways, imposed huge costs on the country.
Public funds that could otherwise be applied to reduce
104. See supra note 98 and accompanying text; Historical Census of Housing
Tables: Homeownership, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/
housing/census/historic/owner.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2016).
105. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that the cost of the mortgage
interest tax deduction in 2016 would represent a $79.2 billion tax expenditure in
2016. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., REP. NO. JCS-1-13,
ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012–2017, at 33
(Comm. Print 2013); see also Will Fischer & Chye-Ching Huang, Mortgage
Interest Deduction Is Ripe for Reform, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (June
25, 2013), http://www.cbpp.org/research/mortgage-interest-deduction-is-ripe-forreform.
106. “A portion of any revenue generated from changes in tax subsidies for
homeownership should be devoted to expanding support for rental housing
programs for low-income populations in need of affordable housing.” HOUSING
AMERICA’S FUTURE, supra note 4, at 12.
107. MID Reform, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION, http://nlihc.org/
unitedforhomes/proposal (last visited Oct. 22, 2016).
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poverty and to help the most financially and socially
vulnerable segments of society have instead been allocated
to upper-middle income families and have been used to
create incentives for homeownership even in particular
personal situations where homeownership did not make
financial sense. Back in 2004, William Apgar of Harvard’s
Joint Center for Economic Studies predicted that
homeownership incentives would eventually have an adverse
effect on the most vulnerable segments of the population.
As William Apgar notes:
When families take on debt that they are unable to
repay, homeownership does not build wealth, but rather
diverts scarce resources away from meeting other
pressing needs. In the worst case scenario, lowerincome homeowners may become trapped in declining
neighborhoods with little access to employment, good
quality schools or social services and equally limited
potential for price appreciation. In these situations, all
too often the dream of homeownership becomes the
nightmare of a financially devastating foreclosure.108
This nightmare has indeed come true for many lowincome and minority Americans who became homebuyers
during the housing boom. Housing policies need to adjust to
reflect the lessons that were taught so compellingly in 2007
and 2008.
Furthermore, compelling societal goals justify a
recalibration of policy aims toward creating “access to decent
and affordable housing” in a suitable living environment for
all Americans.109 Quality housing—be it rental or owneroccupied—is a more justifiable policy aim than universal
promotion of homeownership that not only excludes an
108. APGAR, supra note 5, at 6.
109. Id. at 1, 4–5. “By overstating the potential benefits of homeownership,
today’s policy makers risk diverting resources away from more effective means of
addressing many of the most critical problems that continue to confront lowincome and low-wealth households.” Id. at 4.
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increasingly large segment of the population, but also
increases the likelihood of adverse economic outcomes for
many vulnerable homebuyers.110
III. PUBLIC STRUCTURES TO ENCOURAGE PRIVATE
INVESTMENT RENTAL HOUSING
It will take money to increase the supply of rental
housing and ensure that adequate rental housing remains
affordable to all segments of society. As demand for rental
housing increases, of course, market forces encourages the
growth of rental housing supply. Investors are abundantly
aware of today’s increasing demand for rental housing, and
savvy market players are already making and taking
creative efforts to share in profits from this growing sector.
Private developers have been creating luxury rental projects,
and private equity has been pouring into Wall Street-created
investment pools backed by single-family homes intended for
rental.111 The forces of supply and demand still work, but
there are barriers to a purely market answer to the
affordable housing crisis.
One barrier to a private, market resolution is that the
cost of new construction and rehabilitation outweighs rents
that the lowest-income Americans are able to pay.112 One way
to engage more private investment in affordable housing is
to drive down associated costs, such as the cost of zoning and
other regulatory approvals.113 Another way to engage more
private investment is to use tax credits and other
110. APGAR, supra note 5, at 5 (writing in 2004 that “[t]oday, many low-wealth
and low-income families are being “pushed” into homeownership, not necessarily
because they fully appreciate the implications of their choices, but because they
perceive (or rather hope) that homeownership in and of itself will help them
achieve a better life”). Apgar also accurately foretells that for many low-income
households, the choice to become a homeowner “is a risky and potentially costly
mistake.” Id. at 6.
111. See infra Section III.B.
112. See Affordable Rental Hous. A.C.T.I.O.N., supra note 55, at 12–13.
113. See APGAR, supra note 5, at 27–29.
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government-structured or sponsored financings to increase
available equity capital and reduce the cost of debt.114 The
government also can (and does) intervene to fund the gap
between what people can pay and what landlords must
receive as rent.115 This Article focuses on government efforts
to grow the supply of affordable housing rather than on the
government’s demand-side housing assistance such as
tenant-based and project-based housing vouchers.
Although most government-enabled funding for rental
housing has been applied in the context of multifamily
rentals, recently, private capital has targeted the
acquisition, development, and rental of scattered singlefamily sites—perhaps because demand for this particular
housing type has been increasing the most rapidly in recent
years.116 Increases in private investment in the rental sector,
however, has done little to lower rental rates because (a)
rental supply has not adequately increased to meet
ballooning demand, and (b) private investment in rental
housing is (understandably) clustered at the highest end of
the market. There remains a very real need for active
government involvement in rental housing to channel
114. Streamlining applicable affordable housing program requirements can,
and should, be prioritized to reduce regulatory compliance costs so that the
programs can maximize funding allocation to actual creation of affordable
housing. See infra Section II.A.
115. Rental prices are constrained by people’s income. Already, a significant
percentage of households in America are spending so much on housing that there
is very little left for food, healthcare, and other essentials. See OUT OF REACH,
supra note 3, at 6. If incomes are not going to rise to allow people to pay higher
prices for rentals, then housing assistance payments must be available so that
lower-income renters can afford decent shelter.
116. See Ryan Kurth, Single-Family Housing—The Fastest Growing
Component of the Rental Market, 2 FANNIE MAE DATA NOTE 2 (March 2012),
http://www.fanniemae.com/resources/file/research/datanotes/pdf/data-note0312.pdf (“From 2005 to 2010, single-family units as a share of renter-occupied
stock grew from 30.8 percent to 33.5 percent, which was the largest increase
among all rental property types.”); see also Brenton Hayden, Who is the Modern
Day Tenant? Census Bureau Has New Data, BIGGER POCKETS,
https://www.biggerpockets.com/renewsblog/2013/01/12/modern-day-tenant (last
updated Nov. 14, 2014).
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private investment into growing the supply of affordable
housing. In addition, thoughtful government involvement
can control the locations and rental parameters of affordable
housing options in a socially positive way.
Current federal government programs that help create
and preserve affordable rental housing supply include the
Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC),117 the HOME
Investment Partnerships Program,118 and Community
Development Block Grants (CDBGs).119 Property-based
Section 8 rental assistance and Housing Choice Vouchers
impact supply of affordable housing, albeit in a different, less
direct, way.120 Section 8 assistance takes the form of either
project-based vouchers, used to pay landlords the gap
between affordable rents and a landlord’s necessary return
on investment, as well as Housing Choice Vouchers that
tenants can use to fund the shortfall between rents they can
pay and rents that landlords require. Over 5 million people
in 2.2 million low-income families use housing assistance
vouchers.121 These programs are valuable and likely should
be expanded to better incentivize private capital investment
in affordable housing, but they contribute to rental price
117. Low Income Housing Tax Credit, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV.,
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/lihtc.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2016).
118. HOME Investment Partnership Program, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV.,
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/comm_planning/affo
rdablehousing/programs/home (last visited Oct. 22, 2016).
119. Community Development Block Grant Program—CDBG, U.S. DEP’T
HOUSING & URB. DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_
offices/comm_planning/communitydevelopment/programs (last visited Oct. 22,
2016).
120. See Policy Basics: Section 8 Project-Based Rental Assistance, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, http://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/policy-basicssection-8-project-based-rental-assistance (last updated June 1, 2015); Project
Based Section 8 Rental Assistance, NAT’L COUNCIL ST. HOUSING AGENCIES,
https://www.ncsha.org/advocacy-issues/project-based-section-8-rental-assistance
(last visited Dec. 7, 2016); Housing Choice Vouchers, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB.
DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/public_indian_
housing/programs/hcv/about/fact_sheet (last visited Oct. 22, 2016).
121. Policy Basics: Housing Choice Vouchers Program, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES, http://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/policy-basics-the-housing-choi
ce-voucher-program (last updated Sept. 29, 2015).

2017]

NATION OF RENTERS

135

increases or, at the very least, do not exert a downward
pressure on prices the way that increasing the supply would.
Therefore, it is critical to provide more government tax credit
incentives and gap funding for affordable housing
developments that will grow the housing supply.
Government efforts to grow affordable housing supply
through tax credits and gap funding is discussed in Section
III.A.
In addition to addressing the need to expand current
government efforts to grow affordable housing supply,
Section III.B explains why Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the
GSEs) should expand their role with respect to investment
in affordable housing throughout the country, particularly by
re-defining rental projects to which their funding could be
allocated, looking beyond large, multi-family buildings. The
GSEs could possibly expand capital availability for rental
housing development by creating more variety of
government-sourced or pooled debt initiatives, such as assetbacked securitization structures for scattered site rentals.
These structures could marshal widespread investment
support for affordable rental housing, much as forwardlooking players in the private sector have begun to do for
market and above-market scattered site rentals. If properly
designed and managed, securitization of rental housing
mortgages could better attract private investment funds and
apply these to grow affordable housing. Involvement of the
GSEs, furthermore, could help ensure that rental housing is
produced and maintained for all income levels, and that a
wide variety of rental options are available in all
neighborhoods, including neighborhoods that are “high
opportunity” locations.
A. Tax Credits and Gap Funding for Affordable Housing
Development
Developing real estate is expensive. The costs associated
with real estate development include acquisition of land,
construction of improvements, and the variety of regulatory
compliance/permitting involved at all stages of development.
Renting at below-market rates reduces an owner’s ability to
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recoup these costs. One study estimated that land
development costs would have to be reduced by 28% to make
it profitable for the private sector to create affordable
housing.122 Incomes cannot stretch to allow lower-income
individuals to pay much more for housing, and landlords
cannot make a profit by charging much less. Because rental
rates are necessarily constrained by incomes, the
government must step into the gap to help fund the creation
of affordable rental housing so that lower rents can be
charged. The two primary methods that the government
currently employs to increase and subsidize private
investment in affordable housing are tax credits and gap
funding. If employed correctly, the combination of tax
incentives and gap funding can make private investment in
affordable rental projects profitable.
The LIHTC uses tax policy to encourage the production
of affordable rentals.123 The LIHTC was created by the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 and gives “[s]tate and local LIHTCallocating agencies the equivalent of nearly $8 billion in
annual budget authority to issue tax credits for the
acquisition, rehabilitation, or new construction of rental
housing targeted to lower-income households.”124 States
receive low-income housing tax credits equivalent to $2.35
per person (in 2016), to be distributed in accordance with the
state’s housing finance agency’s tax credit program.125 The
high demand for the limited number of available credits and
the shortage of affordable housing units likely justifies

122. See Affordable Rental Hous. A.C.T.I.O.N., supra note 55, at 6.
123. See About the Low-Income Housing Program, ENTERPRISE, http://www.
enterprisecommunity.com/financing-and-development/low-income-housing-taxcredits/about-lihtc (last visited Oct. 22, 2016).
124. Low Income Housing Tax Credit, supra note 117.
125. OFFICE OF U.S. SENATOR MARIA CANTWELL, ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & HOMELESSNESS: THE HOUSING TAX CREDIT 4 (2016)
[hereinafter CANTWELL], https://www.cantwell.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Senator
%20Cantwell%20LIHTC%20Report.pdf.
OF
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doubling or even tripling the amount of tax credits available
for low-income housing development.126
The LIHTC has leveraged nearly $100 billion in private
investment capital, financing the development of almost 2.9
million affordable rental homes.127 During each year from
1995 to 2014, an average of approximately 1420 projects and
107,000 rental units were brought into service because of
incentives provided by the LIHTC.128 Without the LIHTC
virtually no affordable rental development would happen: it
is a key financing source in almost every affordable rental
project.129
The LIHTC provides tax credits to investors who build,
lease, and maintain affordable housing units throughout a
fifteen-year compliance period.130 Housing qualifies as
affordable housing for purposes of the LIHTC if rents are
affordable (no more than 30% of income) and units are rented
to persons who earn under 60% of the area’s median income
(AMI).131 Generally speaking, most of the actual residents of
LIHTC units earn even less than this threshold—nearly onehalf are below 30% of the area’s AMI.132
Market real estate developments are 60–90% debt
financed, but majority-debt financing for affordable housing
would be economical only if construction costs drastically
fell.133 Affordable housing development is typically only 10–
126. State LIHTC agencies routinely receive applications at a rate double or
triple the number of available allocations annually. Id.
127. Id. at 4–5.
128. Low Income Housing Tax Credit, supra note 117.
129. See Affordable Rental Hous. A.C.T.I.O.N., supra note 55, at 6, 11–13.
130. About the Low-Income Housing Program, supra note 123. To qualify, rental
units must be self-contained (have their own kitchen and bath). JOE BIBER, CSH,
FINANCING SUPPORTIVE HOUSING WITH TAX-EXEMPT BONDS AND 4% LOW-INCOME
HOUSING TAX CREDITS 3 (2007), http://www.csh.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/
Report_financing-withbondsand-litch_1012.pdf.
131. Affordable Rental Hous. A.C.T.I.O.N., supra note 55, at 2.
132. Id. at 3.
133. See id. at 8–10.
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30% hard debt financed.134 The remainder of necessary
development funds comes from equity investment and soft
debt (gap funding through government programs, discussed
infra).135 The LIHTC creates an incentive for equity
investment that acts as a substitute for debt.136
Even though the raw number of the LIHTC tax credits
available did not decline in, during, and after the Financial
Crisis, affordable housing development was periodically
constrained during the years prior to 2016 by falling LowIncome Tax Credit rates.137 In 1986, the Housing Credit rate
was set at 9% for new construction and substantial
rehabilitation, and at 4% for acquisition of affordable units,
but these rates were not fixed, rather, they were to fluctuate
according to a formula related to federal borrowing rates.
The 4% credit is less competitive, but creates a smaller
investment incentive.138 The 9% LIHTC units are more
commonly used for more expensive supportive housing
(housing combined with services, for example for seniors),
but 9% credits are more limited in number, and it is more
competitive to obtain the 9% credits.139 After the Foreclosure
Crisis, low-income housing tax credit rates dipped to historic
lows—what had been 9% fell to 7.5%, and what had been 4%
dropped to 3.2%.140 Decreasing rates meant 15–20% less
housing credit equity became available to finance any given
134. Id. at 9.
135. Id. at 10.
136. Id. at 9.
137. David Black et al., Low-Income Housing Tax Credits: Affordable Housing
Investment Opportunities for Banks, OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY 21 n.69, 24,
https://www.occ.gov/topics/community-affairs/publications/insights/insights-lowincome-housing-tax-credits.pdf (last revised Apr. 2014).
138. Tax-exempt bonds frequently make up the difference in necessary equity
for these projects. See BIBER, supra note 130, at 2, 5, 7–9.
139. See id. at 2; Black, supra note 137, at 10.
140. See Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Rates, AFFORDABLE RENTAL HOUS.
A.C.T.I.O.N., https://static1.squarespace.com/static/566ee654bfe8736211c559eb/
t/56b8b2c2d51cd40ee3924d2a/1454944963109/Housing+Credit+rate+
handout.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2016).
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project, making affordable housing both more expensive and
less likely to be developed.141 After several Congressional
efforts that temporarily propped up Housing Credit rates,142
Congress finally passed the Protecting Americans from Tax
Hikes Act of 2015, making the 9% (and 4%) minimum LIHTC
rates permanent.143
The permanent increase of credit rates to 9% (and 4%)
was a significant way to ensure continued investment in
affordable housing. An example can illustrate why. Imagine
that a sample property with 88 units (22 units at 40% AMI,
34 units at 50% AMI, and 32 units at 60% AMI) costs $16.8
million to build, with $13.8 million of that cost qualifying for
housing credit.144 A 9% rate would bring in $1.24 million in
annual credits to the project, creating incentives for $11.78
million in private investment (assuming the current rate of

141. See id.
142. In the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), Congress
established a minimum 9% rate and simplified state administration of the
program. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289,
§ 3002(a)(2), 122 Stat. 2654, 2879 (2008). This 9% rate was extended through
2013 in the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 302,
126 Stat. 2313, 2328 (2013), and again in the Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014,
Pub. L. No. 113-295, § 112, 128 Stat. 4010, 4014 (2014); see also Affordable Rental
Hous. A.C.T.I.O.N., supra note 55, at 11.
143. Protecting Americans from Tax Hike Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-113, § 131,
129 Stat. 2242, 3040, 3055; see also Emily Cadik, ACTION Campaign Applauds
Congress for Making Permanent the Minimum 9 Percent Low-Income Housing
Tax Credit Rate, AFFORDABLE RENTAL HOUSING A.C.T.I.O.N. (Dec. 18, 2015),
http://rentalhousingaction.org/blog/2016/1/23/action-campaign-applaudscongress-for-making-permanent-the-minimum-9-percent-low-income-housingtax-credit-rate. The bipartisan legislation was introduced in the House (H.R.
2029) and was passed in both the House and Senate with amendments before
being signed by President Obama; both the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees published reports. See H.R. 2029—Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2016, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/
2029/text (last visited Oct. 16, 2016); see also House Ways & Means Comm., Tax
Reform Working Grp. on Real Estate, Statement of the A Call to Invest in Our
Neighborhoods (ACTION) Campaign for the Record, AFFORDABLE RENTAL HOUS.
A.C.T.I.O.N. (Apr. 9, 2013), http://waysandmeans.house.gov/UploadedFiles/
ACTION_Campaign_WG_Comments.pdf.
144. Affordable Rental Hous. A.C.T.I.O.N., supra note 55, at 10.
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$0.95 tax credit price per credit dollar).145 Holding everything
else constant and merely dropping the housing credit rate to
7.47% (as the housing credit rate did in February 2015, for
example), would reduce the amount of annual housing
credits to the project to only $1.03 million, meaning that only
$9.79 million of equity investment would be made
available—a reduction of 17%.146 This would reduce the
housing credit value by $2 million, and that shortfall would
have to be made up somewhere else (A smaller project?
Fewer affordable units?).147
The Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015
stabilized the LIHTC rates, but even more could be done to
improve effectiveness of the program. Because investors
apply for tax credits at a rate of two to three times greater
than the number of credits available, increasing the volume
of available credits could easily grow affordable housing
supply. Even just increasing available credits by 50% would
allow 350,000–400,000 additional affordable units to become
available over ten years.148 Such an increase is justified.
After all, Congress has not increased the volume of available
credits for decades even though the population of renters has
been growing at an increasing rate. In addition, because the
government controls the program, it could use the tax credit
as a vehicle to break up concentrations of poverty, perhaps
by mandating that recipients locate LIHTC projects in better
neighborhoods. Increasing the number of LIHTCs available
and adding a location requirement could allow not only for
an increasing quantity of affordable rental units to be
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. This example is taken from the tables and charts included in Building
Affordable Housing Communities using the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit. Id.
at 10.
148. The ACTION Campaign Calls on Congress to Expand the Low-Income
Housing
Tax
Credit,
AFFORDABLE RENTAL HOUSING A.C.T.I.O.N.,
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/566ee654bfe8736211c559eb/t/56fa94a92ee
b8164e0b750f1/1459262634073/ACTION+Sign-On+Letter+to+Expand+
the+Housing+Credit+-+Mar+2016+Final.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2016).
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produced, but also could increase the number of affordable
housing units located in better quality neighborhoods.149
Increasing the employment of LIHTCs in high-opportunity
neighborhoods would be a key way to increase neighborhood
integration, because projects in higher-cost markets often
require more financial support to be feasible than do projects
in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty.150 This integration
component is a vital next step in affordable housing which
must be made available in various high-opportunity
neighborhoods to be sustainable and create more equitable
outcomes.151 De-concentration of LIHTC housing would lead
to de-concentration of poverty and integration of minority
households.152
The government could also expand the positive effect of
the LIHTC by allowing credits to be used more flexibly, in
integrated market/affordable developments, for example.
The Brookings Institute suggested that the LIHTC could be
used not only to promote development of more affordable
housing units, but also to help create vibrant integrated
“revitalizing
communities”
and
“opportunity-rich
153
communities.”
Development flexibility could also be
channeled to integrate affordable rental units in highopportunity neighborhoods. For example, LIHTCs could also
be made available for the acquisition, rehabilitation, and
rental of scattered site single-family homes (following the
recent Wall Street trend) and two to four unit small rental
149. See An Overview of HUD’s Proposed Affirmatively Furthering Fair
Housing Rule, supra note 86, at 2, 7, 10, 14; Devaney, supra note 86; Katz &
Turner, supra note 86, at 2; Orfield, supra note 87, at 1753, 1789–91; see also
Infranca, supra note 87, at 1137.
150. CANTWELL, supra note 125, at 4, 7. These concepts are endorsed in
HOUSING AMERICA’S FUTURE, supra note 4, at 92, 99, 103.
151. FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN POLICY & MOELIS INST. FOR
AFFORDABLE HOUS. POLICY, WHAT CAN WE LEARN ABOUT THE LOW-INCOME
HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROGRAM BY LOOKING AT THE TENANTS? 2–4, 7–8 (2012).
152. See id.
153. See Katz & Turner, supra note 86, at 11–12. “Revitalizing communities”
referred to communities with “the broadest possible mix of incomes.” Id. at 12.
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operations, and it is simpler and more politically feasible to
integrate single-family rental units in high-opportunity
neighborhoods than it would be to build large multi-family
rental buildings in those neighborhoods.154 Senator Maria
Cantwell, one of the authors of the 2015 Protecting
Americans from Tax Hikes Act, recently introduced
legislation that would “[e]xpand LIHTC allocation by 50
percent” and “[p]romote broader income mixing in LIHTC
projects.”155 Senator Cantwell, also suggests that states
should be given more flexibility “in financing projects
targeting homeless individuals and extremely low-income
families.”156
To date, the LIHTC has not focused on this qualitative
aspect of affordable housing and has stressed quantity over
locality; however, broadening the LIHTC in these ways could
increase the quantity of affordable housing available, and
providing either more location-targeted requirements or,
conversely, allowing states the flexibility to pursue fair
housing goals through design and application of tax credits
could increase the quality of such housing in terms of the
ever-important location, location, location.157
Tax credits alone are usually not enough to encourage
adequate private investment in affordable housing,
particularly housing that is affordable to extremely lowincome renters. There are several ways that the government
supports additional financing to supplement the LIHTCs,
including having Fannie or Freddie provide conventional
154. See Andrea J. Boyack, A New American Dream for Detroit, 93 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
155. CANTWELL, supra note 125, at 6–7. This legislation is endorsed by the
report, “Housing America’s Future.” HOUSING AMERICA’S FUTURE, supra note 4,
at 11.
156. CANTWELL, supra note 125, at 7.
157. See An Overview of HUD’s Proposed Affirmatively Furthering Fair
Housing Rule, supra note 86, at 2, 7, 10, 14; Devany, supra note 86; Katz &
Turner, supra note 86, at 2; Orfield, supra note 87, at 1753, 1789–91; see also
Infranca, supra note 87, at 1137.
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loans for multifamily projects, using federal programs to
source soft/gap financing, and raising funds through the
issuance of tax-exempt (or taxable) bonds. Federal gap
financing is discussed below, and GSE finance is discussed
in Section III.B. Bond financing is in some ways preferable
to conventional financing under GSE programs, because
GSE financing usually involves “shorter maximum terms to
maturity, more restrictive amortization requirements,
higher minimum debt-service coverage ratios and higher
loan-to-value thresholds than are applicable to bond-funded
loans.”158 Additional funding, whether through bonds or soft
financing or even the GSE programs, may help make housing
more accessible to extremely low-income tenants.
Tax-exempt bonds play an important role in financing
about 40% of LIHTC developments.159 Local bonds used with
federal housing credits have financed the development of
over 3 million affordable homes, and are particularly useful
in funding higher-cost developments, such as supportive
housing for seniors.160 Tax-exempt bonds have a lower
interest rate and come with tax credits,161 but the federal
government caps their availability.162 Taxable bonds are
158. JUSTIN COOPER, ORRICK, MULTIFAMILY RENTAL HOUSING: FINANCING WITH
TAX-EXEMPT BONDS, 3 n.1 (2010), https://www.orrick.com/Insights/2010/06/
Multifamily-Rental-Housing-Financing-With-Tax-Exempt-Bonds (follow
“Download attachment” hyperlink).
159. See BIBER, supra note 130, at 2–3, 5; COOPER, supra note 158, at 28.
160. See MICHAEL A. SPOTTS, ENTERPRISE, GIVING DUE CREDIT: BALANCING
PRIORITIES IN STATE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT ALLOCATION POLICIES 4
(2016); BIBER, supra note 130.
161. “Because interest paid on tax-exempt debt is exempt from federal (and
often state) income tax, investors require less interest than they would from
taxable debt to produce the same after tax return.” COOPER, supra note 158, at
3–4.
162. The “volume cap” for tax-exempt bonds imposed by the IRS Code in 2015
is the greater of $100 per state resident or $301,515,000. IRS Publishes Housing
Credit and Bond Caps for 2015, NAT’L COUNCIL STATE HOUS. AGENCIES (Nov. 3,
2014), https://www.ncsha.org/blog/irs-publishes-housing-credit-and-bond-caps2015. Volume cap figures are published by the IRS on an annual basis. See id. All
eligible projects (housing, infrastructure, etc.) must compete for this financing.
BIBER, supra note 130, at 3. Tax-exempt bond funding is also constrained by the
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uncapped, but have higher interest rates and cannot be used
together with tax credits.163 Only local public (or perhaps
quasi-public) agencies, such as the state Housing Finance
Agency or city housing or redevelopment agencies, can issue
tax-exempt bonds for multi-family rental housing.164
In addition to local bond funding, federal grant
programs, such as the HOME Investment Partnerships and
the CDBG Programs provide funding to supplement LIHTCinspired equity investment in affordable housing
developments. The HOME Program provides formula grants
to participating jurisdictions for them to use (often in
conjunction with local non-profits) in funding acquisition,
building, and rehabilitation of affordable housing.165 “HOME
is the largest Federal block grant to state and local
governments designed exclusively” for use in support of
affordable housing.166 Participating jurisdictions must
provide twenty-five cents of value for each federal dollar
used.167 HOME grants could also be tailored to promote
integration of affordable rental units in lower-poverty
neighborhoods. Once again, this might work better if
affordable housing development could think outside the (big)
box of large apartment complexes and consider funding
smaller 2–4 unit buildings and single-family rental options.
The CDBG program provides communities with
development resources. Under this program, annual grants
are allocated to larger cities to help in the development of “a
suitable living environment” for low- and moderate-income

“95/5 Requirement” that mandates at least 95% of bond proceeds be allocated to
costs incurred after the bond issuance. Id. In addition, only 25% of bond proceeds
can be allocated to acquisition costs. Id.
163. See id. at 2.
164. Id. at 3.
165. Some grants also may be used to provide direct rental assistance to lowincome renters. HOME Investment Partnership Program, supra note 118.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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households.168 The CDBG works with the Neighborhood
Stabilization Program, targeting the neighborhoods that
were the “hardest hit” by the Foreclosure Crisis in order to
rehabilitate homes and revitalize the neighborhood.169
Metropolitan cities with at least 50,000 people and urban
counties of 200,000 or more are entitled to funding under the
CDBG program, and smaller non-entitlement localities may
receive funds that have been allocated to states for
distribution.170 In order to obtain funding under these grants,
the grantee must first develop a plan that provides for citizen
participation in the community, with a particular emphasis
on citizenship participation by low/moderate income
residents in slum or blighted areas.171 Traditionally, the
CDBGs have been only allocated to blighted areas, but in
order to create more integrated housing options, the program
could be expanded to apply to affordable housing creation
within non-blighted areas, especially in “neighborhoods of
opportunity.”
Although federal grants could (and should) do more to
improve the quality of location for affordable housing
developments that they support, arguably the biggest
problem in gap funding by the government is that there
simply is not enough of it. A decade ago, housing analysts
called upon the government to expand the availability of gap
funding and private equity capital incentives, indicating that
it was critically important to expand the supply of affordable
rental housing across the nation.172 Unfortunately, during
the past decade of economic recession, federal funding for
housing affordability grants programs (and other housing
assistance, such as voucher programs), was slashed rather
than augmented. Instead of increasing grant funding in
168. Community Development Block Grant Program—CDBG, supra note 119.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See id.
172. See Katz & Turner, supra note 86, at 14.
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response to increasing rental demand, grants and soft
financing through the HOME and CDBG programs is
growing even scarcer.173 For example, funding for HOME
Programs has been cut 44% since 2011.174
Today, gap funding is inadequate to keep up with
growing demand for new units and necessary rehabilitation,
let alone make up for the recent budget crisis years that
caused the supply shortfall to worsen. Funding needs to be
sufficient both to build new affordable rental units and
maintain and renovate the numerous affordable housing
units that are older and rapidly deteriorating.175 For
example, the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities
estimates that $26 billion is immediately required to
adequately rehabilitate and maintain existing public
housing.176 Proposed legislation, such as the Housing
Opportunities Through Modernization Act of 2016, would try
to address the supply shortfall and the dire and unmet need
for affordable housing renovation by giving local agencies
greater flexibility in the use of public funds.177
Another deficiency in current government tax credit and
grant programs concerns the type of housing to which the
programs apply. Affordable housing grant and tax credit
programs typically subsidize larger properties and projects,
173. Affordable Rental Hous. A.C.T.I.O.N., supra note 55, at 13.
174. Id.
175. See APGAR, supra note 5, at 3.
176. See Bipartisan Housing Bill Would Cut Costs, Reduce Homelessness, and
Improve Access to High-Opportunity Neighborhoods, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES, http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/hotma-factsheet__final.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
177. Id. The House of Representatives unanimously passed the Housing
Opportunities Through Modernization Act (H.R. 3700) in February 2016. Id. If it
passes the Senate and is signed into law, the Act will be the first major
authorizing federal legislation affecting voucher and public housing programs
since the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act in 1998. Will Fischer,
Housing Bill Unanimously Passed by House Would Build on Effectiveness of
Rental Assistance, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES http://www.cbpp.org/
research/housing/housing-bill-unanimously-passed-by-house-would-build-oneffectiveness-of-rental (last revised Feb. 17, 2016).
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not smaller ones.178 It is challenging for owners of smaller
rental properties to obtain adequate capital to maintain the
units. This is one reason why scattered single-family rentals
are being funded through the private market, even though
multifamily housing projects are often funded with
government participation and input. Again, a complete
picture of the affordability conundrum for rental housing
must acknowledge that it is not just a question of how many
units are available, and how much rental charges will be, but
also where the rental options are located and the housing
type being offered for rent.
B. Expanding the Rental Market Role of the GSEs
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are famous for the pivotal
role they have played in encouraging homeownership, but
Fannie and Freddie also provide critical support for
multifamily rental housing development.179 The GSEs are
the primary lender for multifamily housing developments.
For example, in 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac provided
funding for 84% of all mortgage loans secured by multifamily
rental buildings.180 In 2014, the GSEs provided over $57
billion of funding for multi-family loans, although this
amount was well below the 2007 GSE multi-family funding
amount of $67 billion.181 In terms of market share, however,
the GSE’s once dominant position has recently fallen to just
under 30% of all multi-family mortgage originations.182
GSE-funded mortgage loans to multifamily housing
projects do not represent direct government aid—rather,
178. APGAR, supra note 5, at 26.
179. Boyack, Laudable Goals, supra note 95, at 1491–93.
180. See Nick Timiraos, Fannie, Freddie Woes Hurt Apartments, WALL STREET
J., Nov. 18, 2009, at C1; Housing Finance Reform: The Multifamily Perspective,
NAT’L MULTI HOUSING COUNCIL [hereinafter NMHC PERSPECTIVE],
http://content.aristotle.com/NAA/GSE_2011-07.pdf (last updated July 2011).
181. KARAN KAUL, URBAN INST., THE GSES’ SHRINKING ROLE IN THE MULTIFAMILY
MARKET 3 (2015), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publicationpdfs/2000174-The-GSEs-Shrinking-Role-in-the-Multifamily-Market.pdf.
182. Id. at 4.
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they are a government-structured channeling of private
investment capital into certain investments, much in the
same way as Fannie and Freddie channel capital into the
single-family residential mortgage market by purchasing,
pooling, and securitizing prime loans. The GSEs stabilize
home mortgage capital, and have contributed to America’s
residential mortgage capital flows being, arguably, the most
consistent in the world.183 Fannie and Freddie play such a
dominant role in residential mortgage financing that nongovernmental mortgage finance providers, such as banks,
pension plans, and life insurance companies, have
historically focused on purely commercial projects rather
than multifamily residential developments.184 In the rental
market, the GSEs play a less visible but still vitally
important role. Fannie and Freddie attract and allocate
investment to multifamily mortgage loans, contributing to
the production of millions of units of market-rate rental
housing.185
Fannie’s and Freddie’s homeownership promoting role
came under fire during the Foreclosure Crisis in 2008 when
the government placed both of the GSEs into conservatorship
because of losses related to home mortgage loans. Post-Crisis
proposals called for termination of the GSEs, but generally
neglected to consider Fannie and Freddie’s contribution to

183. See NMHC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 180; Boyack, Laudable Goals, supra
note 95, at 1492–93; Letter from Douglas M. Bibby, President, Nat’l Multi
Housing Council, Douglas S. Culkin, President, Nat’l Apartment Ass’n & David
S. Schless, President, Am. Seniors Housing Ass’n, to Hon. Timothy F. Geithner,
Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury & Hon. Shaun Donovan, Secretary, U.S.
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. (July 21, 2010), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10.1.1.170.8695&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
184. See CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, A RESPONSIBLE MARKET FOR RENTAL HOUSING
FINANCE: ENVISIONING THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. SECONDARY MARKET FOR
MULTIFAMILY RESIDENTIAL RENTAL MORTGAGES (2010) [hereinafter RENTAL
HOUSING FINANCE],
https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/
issues/2010/10/pdf/multifamilyhousingreport.pdf.
185. NMHC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 180.
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the multifamily rental market.186 When concerns about
inadvertent, adverse impacts to the rental market from
winding up the GSEs did come up, government officials made
assurances that winding down Fannie and Freddie would not
necessarily mean the end of governmental capital support of
multifamily rental development.187 Everyone who recognized
Fannie and Freddie’s role in rental housing capitalization
agreed that the loss of GSE support of multifamily rental
capital would have been catastrophic.188 Because the GSEs
had not experienced losses in the multi-family sector, and
because of the continuing critical need to encourage rental
housing production, many industry experts remained
confident that Fannie and Freddie would continue their role
in providing capital to market-rate rental developments. For
example, Richard Campo, CEO of Camden Properties Trust,
stated “[t]he idea that the government is going to do
something negative to affordable housing in this interim
period . . . seems pretty far fetched.”189 In spite of Campo’s
assertion that government support of affordable rental
housing was secure, however, government funding of
affordable housing initiatives was gutted in the aftermath of
186. See Boyack, Laudable Goals, supra note 95, at 1495, 1506–07; see, e.g., U.S.
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY & U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., REFORMING
AMERICA’S HOUSING FINANCE MARKET: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 12 (2011)
[hereinafter TREASURY/HUD REPORT], http://treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/
Reforming%20America’s%20Housing%20Finance%20Market.pdf;
Peter
Lawrence, Multifamily Finance: The Neglected Issue in the Fannie-Freddie
Debate, 2 J. TAX CREDITS 1, 1 (2011) (“[W]hat may get lost in this vigorous and
consequential GSE debate is ensuring that a well-performing, highly liquid
capital market for multifamily rental housing continues.”).
187. See TREASURY/HUD REPORT, supra note 186, at 2.
188. See id. at 7. Had the GSEs not continued funding multifamily housing from
2008 to 2010, there would have been widespread foreclosures on performing
apartment property loans as owners of these projects would have been unable to
obtain capital to re-finance at maturity. See generally JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS.
STUDIES, HARVARD UNIV., MEETING MULTIFAMILY HOUSING FINANCE NEEDS
DURING AND AFTER THE CREDIT CRISIS: A POLICY BRIEF 12–13 (2009) (warning that
without loan purchases by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, “apartment
transactions could come to a near standstill”).
189. Timiraos, supra note 180 (alterations in original).
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the Foreclosure Crisis and continues to suffer government
budgetary shortfalls at every level today.190
Unlike federal aid programs that focus on significantly
below-market housing that would be affordable to low- and
extremely low-income renters, GSE support of multifamily
development tends to grow the supply of rental units that are
at-market or slightly below-market.191 About 90% of the
rental units financed through the GSE programs, however,
have been affordable to families at or below median
income.192 The GSE lending and securitization models
coupled with the low default rates for rental housing loans
mean that the financing of such affordable units has not only
been essentially tax and budget neutral to date, but has
actually earned money for the government to use
elsewhere.193 Because of the federal deficit crisis, it is
particularly helpful (and hopeful) to focus on efforts that
increase the overall supply of rental housing without
requiring a government subsidy,194 and Fannie and Freddie
190. See supra notes 140–143 and accompanying text.
191. This is by design: The GSE’s multifamily rental finance role was
envisioned to allocate private funds to provide housing to those who can afford to
pay reasonable housing costs, freeing up governmental funds to provide subsidies
to people who cannot. See Boyack, Laudable Goals, supra note 95, at 1506.
“Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac developed expertise in profitably providing
financing to the middle of the rental market, where housing is generally
affordable to moderate-income families.” TREASURY/HUD REPORT, supra note 186,
at 20. The vast bulk of below-market housing costs, on the other hand, are
provided through the FHA. See Anthony Pennington-Cross & Anthony M. Yezer,
The Federal Housing Administration in the New Millennium, 11 J. HOUSING RES.
357 (2000).
192. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac & FHA: Taxpayer Exposure in the Housing
Markets: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Budget H.R., 112th Cong. (2011).
193. “The multifamily portfolio has earned net revenues of $2 billion for the
taxpayers since conservatorship.” Id.
194. See RENTAL HOUSING FINANCE, supra note 184. Approximately 30 million
of the 36.7 million rental units in America have not been subsidized by the federal
government. Id. at 9; 2008 HARVARD BALANCING STUDY, supra note 10, at 12. Even
so, the specter of un-affordability of housing hangs over rental housing as a
whole, since renters spend a disproportionately higher share of their income to
meet their housing needs. 2010 HARVARD HOUSING STUDY, supra note 10, at 27;
see also supra Part I.
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have been able to fund multifamily rental housing at little to
no taxpayer cost, even during the Financial Crisis.195
Providing liquidity for market-rate multifamily rental
mortgages may seem less related to housing affordability
than direct aid to low-income tenants and their landlords,
tax credits, and gap funding of low-income rental projects,
but capital access does play a vital role in helping the
housing market better respond to burgeoning rental demand
nationwide. Increased flow of mortgage capital lowers the
cost of producing rental units, and allows suppliers to
respond more cost-effectively to housing consumers’
demands. Lower costs and higher availability of capital for
rental housing projects will help to naturally grow the supply
of rentals, and increased supply will put downward pressure
on prices, keeping market rents from getting too high.
Because rental affordability is currently an issue for almost
all renters—not only those at the lowest end of the income
spectrum—this sort of market solution is a key aspect to
solving the housing affordability puzzle.
Not only do the GSEs increase multifamily mortgage
capital availability at little to no taxpayer cost on the front
end, this is done with significantly less taxpayer risk on the
back end because it is less likely that government funds will
be expended in a bailout due to rental project mortgage
defaults than due to owner-occupied mortgage defaults. To
date, defaults in the multifamily rental sector have been
extremely low; less than 1% of the GSE-guaranteed loans
have defaulted.196 One reason that the multifamily housing
loan portfolios of the GSEs did not contribute to entity losses
and taxpayer bailout even when home mortgage sectors were
195. See RENTAL HOUSING FINANCE, supra note 184, at 10; see also Michael
Stoler, Fannie, Freddie, and the Multifamily Market, N.Y. SUN (Sept. 18, 2008),
http://www.nysun.com/real-estate/fannie-freddie-and-the-multifamilymarket/86102 (explaining that the multifamily housing sector was “holding up
the best” even at the height of the crisis, but that if the GSEs focused on their
single family problems and ignored multi-family lending, that could change).
196. RENTAL HOUSING FINANCE, supra note 184, at 11–12; NMHC PERSPECTIVE,
supra note 180.
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plummeting is because multifamily rental projects remained
well underwritten, even during the heyday of bad mortgages
(2005–2007).197 In addition, because a far lower percentage
of multifamily loans are securitized (compared with
securitized single-family home mortgages), a significant
portion of multifamily loans remain in GSE portfolios, giving
the companies more “skin in the game.”198 It is less necessary
and more difficult to pool and securitize multifamily rental
loans because they are individually bigger and more
idiosyncratic than single-family residential mortgages.199
197. One reason that rental properties in general have fared better during the
housing crisis is that revenue-producing properties were usually subject to a
different pricing methodology, namely stream-of-income method. Valuation
based on the stream of income was linked to a less-manipulable variable, namely
salary levels, and these provided some constraint in appraisals. The bubble did
not grow as fast or as large in sectors where housing was priced according to the
stream-of-income method, which meant the fundamentals upon which a loan was
assessed and underwritten were more reliable and the loan less risky. For an in
depth discussion of stream-of-income valuation and other more bubble-prone
systems, see Andrea J. Boyack, Lessons in Price Stability from the U.S. Real
Estate Market Collapse, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 925, 932–36 (2010).
198. See INGRID GOULD ELLEN ET AL., IMPROVING U.S. HOUSING FINANCE
THROUGH REFORM OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC: ASSESSING THE OPTIONS 6
(2010); NMHC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 180.
199. “Larger individual loans make the risk harder to spread through pooling
(multifamily loan pools typically have fewer, larger mortgages), and lower
uniformity of these transactions increases the costs of credit and collateral due
diligence as well as the cost of pricing and underwriting the loans.” Boyack,
Laudable Goals, supra note 95, at 20. Commercial loans generally share these
characteristics as well: they are larger, more idiosyncratic, and less uniform. In
addition, there is no federal or quasi-federal agency guaranty for commercial
loans, so all commercial mortgage lending operates outside the GSE sphere. This
is why commercial lending lagged residential mortgage backed securitization
both in terms of timing (starting later historically) and in terms of volume (lower
amounts of CMBS). See Sophie Ahlswede & Tobias Just, Commercial Real Estate
Loans Facing Refinancing Risks: CMBS Only Part of a Growing Problem,
DEUTSCHE BANK RES. 7–9 (July 6, 2010), http://www.dbresearch.com/
PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000259822.PDF. The only
time CMBS volume represented significant market share was in the five to ten
years prior to the housing crisis, suggesting it was fueled by over-speculation
rather than stable investment capital choices. See id. at 8; see also John B. Levy,
CMBS Volume Hits Record High, NAT’L REAL EST. INV. (Aug. 1, 2005),
http://nreionline.com/commentary/cmbs-volume-hits-record-high. Global CMBS
issuance hit its highest point ever in 2007 at a volume of $324 billion—five times
the volume of 2000. Ahlswede & Just, supra, at 8. Then the CMBS market
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Even though Fannie and Freddie have long played a key
and cost-effective role in supporting affordable housing, their
participation in the multifamily market has recently steeply
decreased.200 Some of this reduction was motivated, perhaps,
by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) Strategic
Plan introduced in 2012 that mandated reduced volumes of
lending in multiple sectors for both Fannie and Freddie,
including lending in the multi-family market.201 The
Strategic Plan required each of Fannie and Freddie to cut
their multifamily rental lending by at least 10%, supposedly
in order to entice more private capital investment to support
multifamily rental development.202 In the wake of this
regulatory mandated reduction, not only did multifamily
mortgage volume fall by nearly 13%, but the aggregate loss
of lending in three underserved segments of the rental
market fell by much more—lending to projects involving
subsidy-dependent targeted affordable multifamily housing,
manufactured housing, and small multifamily projects
suffered a combined reduction of 24% in 2013.203 In 2014, the
FHFA, which oversees the GSEs, took steps to exempt these
underserved market segments from mandatory volume
reductions for the GSEs; but nevertheless, the lending
volume for these categories fell by another 15% that year.204
These recent reductions in the volume of GSE support of
rental housing is rather alarming, especially considering the
plummeted over the following year to $25 billion in 2008—only about 10% of its
value just the year before. Id. In 2008, however, CMBS volume fell dramatically.
Al Yoon, CMBS Volume Now Seen Plunging to Six-Year Low, REUTERS (Apr. 3,
2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/mortgages-commercial-volume-idUSN034
2726520080403; Jim Clayton, P&Ls: Pricing, Liquidity and Leverage, PREA Q.,
Winter 2009, at 46. Multifamily housing has not suffered from any such drop,
however, since it has been—and is still—supported through GSE secondary
market purchasing.
200. See generally KAUL, supra note 181.
201. See id. at 6–8.
202. See id. at 6.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 6–7.
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increasing demand for rentals and the intensifying crisis in
rental affordability.205 Not only should the GSEs continue to
play their critical role in providing capital liquidity to market
multifamily rental projects, this role should be expanded.
The volume of rental housing capital support must be
augmented, not reduced, particularly in the context of
affordable housing development.
In addition to robustly supporting multifamily rental
development, Fannie and Freddie should lend to smaller
rental projects as well. Under the FHA’s definitions,
“multifamily” means a structure with five or more residential
units, and “single-family” lumps single-family homes in with
duplexes and three- and four-unit dwellings.206 GSE
mortgage programs for rental projects focus almost
exclusively on “multifamily” rentals. The “single-family”
mortgages sponsored by the GSEs, on the other hand,
usually require owner-occupancy. This means that there is
virtually no GSE capital support for single-family rental
homes, as well as rentals of units in two, three, or fourdwelling unit structures.
Single-family rentals, including one-dwelling-unit
homes as well as two- to four-unit houses, make up 53% of
all rental units in the United States, 22.6 million units of
housing.207 By grouping one- to four-unit buildings into
“single family” wherein owner-occupancy is key, the GSEs
have ignored half of the rental market. These rather shortsighted groupings of housing types therefore end up shutting
many rental options out from public financing, which
205. See, e.g., FREDDIE MAC, MULTIFAMILY OUTLOOK 2016: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1, 5 (2016) (explaining that “[d]emand for multifamily rental housing was higher
than expected in 2015, absorbing much of the newly completed supply,” and that
“[t]he multifamily sector performed better than anticipated in 2015 despite the
large flow of new completions to the market”).
206. APGAR, supra note 5, at 27.
207. DAN MAGDER & LAURIE GOODMAN, URBAN INST., SINGLE FAMILY RENTALS: A
NEW APPROACH TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING 2 (2015), http://www.urban.org/sites/
default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000423-Single-Family-Rentals-A-NewApproach-to-Affordable-Housing.pdf.
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perhaps explains why Wall Street has found such fertile
ground for investment in single-family rentals.208 Even
though private investment in housing is desirable, public
funding permits more control of rental rates and location and
may help achieve fair housing objectives at the same time as
affordable housing needs are addressed.
There is no logical reason why GSE financing programs
for rentals should not be expanded to cover smaller scattered
site rental projects of one to four units.209 In fact, the GSEs
could even do much better with respect to financing five to
fifty unit buildings.210 Smaller multifamily rental
developments traditionally have struggled with more limited
financing (in both the public and private sectors) simply
because secondary market resale and securitization of these
middle-sized idiosyncratic mortgages are more challenging
and expensive.211 Nevertheless, these sorts of projects are
incredibly important in order to have neighborhoods that
combine owner-occupancy options with rental options of all
types and for all income levels. GSE use of securitization to
support rental housing could, therefore, be improved and
expanded (even if it requires a partial federal subsidy to do
so).212
Wall Street has seized upon this gap in federally
sponsored funding, recently targeting smaller rental projects

208. See infra notes 194–196 and accompanying text.
209. See APGAR, supra note 5, at 27; see also MAGDER & GOODMAN, supra note
207, at 2–4.
210. See id.
211. See id.; CHRISTOPHER E. HERBERT, ABT ASSOCS., AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
AVAILABILITY AND COST OF FINANCING FOR SMALL MULTIFAMILY PROPERTIES (2001),
http://abtassociates.com/reports/01-024.pdf.
212. Apgar suggests that affordable housing finance go beyond project-specific
financing and more aggressively use capital markets to raise funds by
aggregating, pooling, and syndicating mortgage capital (perhaps both equity &
debt). See APGAR, supra note 5, at 8. Apgar notes that aggregating and
securitization can create efficiencies, noting that affordable housing projects are
high performing/low risk investments. See id.
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as untapped sources for new real estate investments.213
Analysts now predict a near trillion-dollar single-family
rental securitization market by 2019.214 From 2012 to 2014
alone, private equity firms and institutional investors
invested nearly $20 billion in rental real estate, acquiring
over 200,000 single-family homes (mostly in foreclosure
sales) to serve as assets backing securitized debt pools sold
to investors.215 If this structure sounds eerily familiar, it is
because it is similar to the private label mortgage-backed
securitization that funneled capital into residential
mortgage markets and drove up home purchase prices
creating a housing bubble during the first several years of
the twenty-first century. Of course, this bubble was followed
by the devastating Foreclosure Crisis in 2007–2008. In both
mortgage-backed securitization (MBS) and single-family
rental (SFR) securitization, mortgage-backed debt
obligations are sold off to investors as securities, and the
equity investment capital is used to acquire additional
mortgage interests. In 2014 and 2015, however, title to
collateral real estate was held by a Wall Street firm’s
subsidiary company rather than by thousands of individual
homeowners, and instead of tens of thousands of individual
loans secured by individual mortgages, there is typically one
huge loan to the company, secured by thousands of

213. See HOMES FOR ALL, RENTING FROM WALL STREET: BLACKSTONE’S
INVITATION HOMES IN LOS ANGELES AND RIVERSIDE 15 (July 2014) [hereinafter
RENTING
FROM
WALL
STREET],
http://homesforall.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/LA-Riverside-Blackstone-Report-071514.pdf.
214. See Kerri Ann Panchuk, Single-Family Rental Securitization Market
Boasts near Trillion-Dollar Potential, HOUSING WIRE (Nov. 1, 2013),
http://www.housingwire.com/articles/27772-single-family-rental-%20
securitization-market-boasts-trillion-dollar-potential.
215. See RENTING FROM WALL STREET, supra note 213, at 9; Sarah Edelman et
al., When Wall Street Buys Main Street: The Implications of Single-Family Rental
Bonds for Tenants and Housing Markets, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 27, 2014),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2014/02/27/84750/wh
en-wall-street-buys-main-street-2.
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mortgages on the individual properties it owns and rents
out.216
Although the structure of SFR securitization is basically
the same as pre-crisis MBS, in theory, SFR securitization
should be less risky (in some ways) because a diversified
corporate entity, rather than a collection of individual
owners, holds the title to the collateral, and because the
properties’ collateral value derives from a rental income
stream, not from a predicted resale value and appreciation
gains. SFR securities have proved popular in the short term.
In just two years since their creation, these SFR
securitizations, have attracted more than $13 billion in
investment dollars.217
The trend of Wall Street investment in, and
securitization of, scattered-site rental properties could be
either troubling or encouraging (or, ironically, both). On the
one hand, some commentators decry the transfer of
ownership from individual homeowners to corporate entities
because this could represent a parallel transfer of wealth
from households to financial institutions. On the other hand,
transfer of ownership from homeowners who lost their homes
in foreclosure is already, in most cases, a foregone conclusion,
resulting from the bad loans made during the housing boom.
A good case could be made that institutional investment
purchase of these homes at foreclosure created a
neighborhood benefit, because the alternative may well have
been that foreclosing mortgage lenders would have taken
title to these properties and would have continued to hold
them as vacant post-foreclosure inventory (REO properties).
Multiple vacant REO properties in a neighborhood are
216. See Laurie Goodman, Single-Family Securitized Financing: A Blueprint for
the Future?, URBAN INST. (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/
alfresco/publication-pdfs/412992-Single-Family-Securitized-Financing-ABlueprint-for-the-Future-.pdf.
217. Brian Honea, Single-Family Rental Securitizations Surpass $13 Billion in
Issuance in Just Two Years, DS NEWS (Oct. 21, 2015, 3:36 PM), http://www.
dsnews.com/news/10-21-2015/single-family-rental-securitizations-surpass-13billion-in-issuance-in-just-two-years.
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devastating to the entire community, including the nondefaulting homeowners.218 If Wall Street investment in
foreclosed homes prevents that reality, perhaps it is the
lesser of two evils.219
Wall Street’s SFR sector is new and notable and raises
intriguing possibilities (good and bad), but to date,
institutional investment in scattered site rentals remains
very limited—a mere 2% of the existing single-family
stock.220 Even though this housing type provides some of the
most affordable rental options in the market, the vast
majority of single-family rentals are financed without
institutional or public support. This leads to the conclusion
that if capital access were improved for this sector, such
housing types could become even more affordable to renters.
Currently, however, neither the LIHTC nor GSE multifamily
loans are available and allocated to single-family rentals.221
The GSEs have an important role to play in the market,
occupying a place in between purely private Wall Street real
estate investment structures and publicly funded housing
assistance, tax credits, and grants. If properly structured,
the GSEs could seize more control of rental placement and
rental rates in their financed projects, because the capital
provider role will give the GSEs (and the FHFA) a means to
exert oversight over landlords. At the same time, this
oversight need not be purchased with taxpayer funds,
because GSE financing structures do attract private

218. See Boyack, A New American Dream for Detroit, supra note 154, at 26–27.
219. Industry analysts have already started to grapple with the question of
whether SFR Securitizations are a laudable or dangerous financial and societal
development. Compare MAGDER & GOODMAN, supra note 207, with Yves Smith,
Hidden Bomb in Single-Family Rental Securitizations: Trigger Risk, NAKED
CAPITALISM (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2014/09/hiddenbomb-rental-securitizations-trigger-risk.html.
220. MAGDER & GOODMAN, supra note 207, at 3.
221. MAGDER & GOODMAN, supra note 207, at 5. HUD’s 223f multifamily loans
and loans under the Community Reinvestment Act are likewise unavailable to
single-family rental developments. Id.
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investment. The GSEs could therefore even further enlarge
private sector funding of housing.
Fannie and Freddie’s investment in rental project
mortgages can also work to ensure diversity on two levels:
sources of funding and location of rental housing. GSE
involvement in securitization ensures that many types and
sizes of lenders (including neighborhood and community
banks, credit unions, etc.) can access the secondary mortgage
market.222 The only way that such smaller lenders can
realistically compete with Wall Street investment firms is
through partnering with the GSEs, much as they do in the
realm of single-family mortgage lending. In addition, Fannie
and Freddie could, and likely should, promote efforts to deconcentrate the location of rental housing and encourage a
wide variety of types of rentals in every residential
neighborhood. In this way, the GSEs could help not only to
address the growing rental population and the housing
affordability crisis, but also make inroads in de-segregating
housing across America.
CONCLUSION
America’s rental housing is inadequate in terms of
location, quality, and affordability. Based on the current
“sweeping changes” in the country’s demographics and
222. HOUSING AMERICA’S FUTURE, supra note 4, at 8–9, (calling for greater
private sector funding of housing and calling “the dominant position currently
held by the government” capital “unsustainable”). The report advocates for
“greater participation by risk-bearing private capital” and a “greater diversity of
funding sources.” Id. Interestingly, this report does not recommend an expanded
securitization role for the GSEs, and in fact, advocates winding down Fannie and
Freddie and replacing them with a wholly-owned government corporation that
would provide a government guarantee backstop for owner and renter markets.
See id. The report suggests that all mortgage-backed securitization should be
privatized (“originators, issuers of securities, credit enhancers, and mortgage
servicers—should be private-sector entities fully at risk for their own finances”),
id. at 9, but this suggestion ignores the comparative disadvantage that smaller
lenders (for both homeowner purchasers and rental projects) would have in
comparison to Wall Street. Centralizing securitization in Wall Street in itself
creates problems.
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economy, these inadequacies are likely to grow.223 Federal
housing policies do not sufficiently consider and address the
growing unmet needs of almost half of the nation’s residents
who rent, rather than own, their homes. This must change.
Although homeownership remains an individual goal for
many Americans, from a social policy standpoint, it is more
pressing that the government allocate its primary efforts and
funds toward improving universal adequacy of rental
housing in terms of its quality, location, and affordability.
The federal government already plays a critical role in
subsidizing the development of affordable rental housing,
but these efforts would have to be quadrupled just in order
to cover existing needs. The significant shortfall in affordable
housing availability justifies diverting taxpayer support of
homeownership—for example, from the $80 billion mortgage
interest deduction subsidy—toward an expanded number of
low-income housing tax credits and gap funding (as well as
housing assistance vouchers). Expansion of federal
affordable housing funding should simultaneously strive to
de-concentrate poverty and increase neighborhood diversity.
Government support of rental housing can also occur
through less expensive, more creative, structuring efforts,
however, and there is no budgetary reason not to expand
such efforts. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have long played
a pivotal role in assembling and allocating private capital to
multifamily rental projects, and this role has helped support
the growth of rental housing supply. These efforts must
continue at least until rental rates become affordable. In
addition, GSE and other funding methods should be
broadened to apply to more than large multifamily projects.
Channeling public and private funding into other types of
rental housing, including in particular scattered site singlefamily and two to four unit housing projects, would reduce
costs associated with these dwellings and therefore improve
rental affordability. More than half of the nation’s rental
223. See Nelson, The New Urbanity, supra note 2, at 192 (calling the shift to
rental households “as sweeping a change to America’s metropolitan landscape as
the half century after World War II”).
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units are outside of large multi-family projects, and these
housing types should not be forgotten or ignored. For
example, if the GSEs supported single-family rental housing
at the secondary mortgage market level, capital costs for
such housing would drop, as would the landlords’ required
rental rates.
Finally, growing the supply of affordable housing should
be done in a way that specifically promotes fair housing goals
as well. Currently, publicly subsidized housing is
concentrated in high-density structures in low-income
neighborhoods. If tax credits, grant funding, and GSEsupported lending were allocated preferentially to affordable
rental housing located in high-opportunity neighborhoods,
more affordable housing options would be located in such
neighborhoods, helping to de-concentrate poverty and
integrate populations in terms of both income and race.
Integration of rental housing into high-opportunity
neighborhoods is fraught with political difficulties. Indeed,
the Obama administration recently bemoaned the fact that
“local barriers to housing development” have “intensified”
over the past thirty years.224 But zoning and other legal
barriers to locating affordable housing in higher-income
neighborhoods primarily focus on housing type (multifamily,
for example), rather than rental rates or non-owner-occupant
status. It would therefore be far easier to integrate singlefamily rentals into such communities than it would be to
coerce these communities to accommodate new, large
multifamily affordable housing developments. Broadening
capital availability can therefore both increase the supply of
rental housing as well as enable affordable housing to be
located in less renter-concentrated neighborhoods. In
addition, GSE and government involvement in rental
housing development may permit government oversight to
ensure fairness of rental terms and rates.

224. THE WHITE HOUSE, HOUSING DEVELOPMENT TOOLKIT 2 (2016), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/Housing_Development_Toolkit%20f.2.
pdf.

